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“
”
It is possible to see  
something good and 
to work for it and  
even dare to achieve it.  
Don't be a spectator.  
You are needed in every  
corner of the community.
Elsie Hillman (second woman from left) greets presidential candidate Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1952.
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F O R E w O R d 
 “We live in a world in which we need to share responsibility. It’s easy 
to say, ‘It’s not my child, not my community, not my world, not my problem.’ 
Then there are those who see the need and respond. I consider those 
people my heroes.”– Fred Rogers
 The Institute of Politics at the University of Pittsburgh has a long 
and rich history of creating opportunities to help regional leaders and 
the general public to see and understand our shared responsibility for 
improving the quality of the lives of those in our home region. We do this 
by offering educational programming and publications that address the 
pressing economic, social, and political issues that confront our region. 
At the Institute, we have recognized that the availability of rich archival 
collections of national and local dignitaries provides a unique opportunity 
to expand the breadth and depth of our academic offerings to students, 
elected	and	public	officials,	and	the	general	public.	To	date,	the	Institute	
has developed case studies from the archival collections of former Penn-
sylvania Governor Dick Thornburgh (focusing on the state’s response  
to the Three Mile Island nuclear accident) and the late U.S. Senator  
H. John Heinz III (in which we examined market-based incentives in 
environmental policy). These case studies are used in colleges, universities, 
and policy centers throughout the United States.
 In 2009, Institute leadership began a conversation with Elsie  
Hillman about tapping her archival collection to develop a case study  
on civic engagement and leadership. Unlike the earlier case studies  
that	focused	on	a	specific	pivotal	event	or	public	policy,	this	case	study	
would illustrate that despite one’s political, social, or economic means, 
individuals—and youth in particular—can be productive agents for  
positive change. 
 Because of that broad theme that describes how individuals can 
improve the community around them, several foundations generously 
2contributed to the funding of this project: The Buhl Foundation, Heinz 
Endowments, The Pittsburgh Foundation, and PNC Foundation. Their 
goal, like that of the Institute of Politics, is not to advance a political 
philosophy	or	any	specific	opinions	that	are	represented	in	this	book	
but to celebrate the character and leadership of Elsie Hillman—traits 
that, if emulated, can empower emerging and seasoned leaders to be 
effective change agents through civic engagement. This case study, then, 
examines the art of the “skilled social actor,” a term that describes an 
individual’s ability to be focused on others, move beyond differences, 
and seek solutions for a greater good.
 Our nation now faces a number of daunting challenges that leave 
many wondering why Congress and the White House are unable to put 
partisanship aside for the greater good of the country. This polarization 
is the exact reason why the Institute felt that the time was right to 
provide a case study that focuses on civic engagement and leadership, 
for Hillman’s story is a unique example of how to work in cooperation 
for the greater good. 
	 It	was	difficult	to	determine	the	focus	of	this	case	study	because	
Hillman	has	done	so	much	in	so	many	aspects	of	her	life.	We	finally	
settled on her role and rise in leadership in the Republican Party  
because it was, as she said, a primary focus of her life and family  
for more than 50 years. 
 You will read within these pages about how Hillman, through her 
thoughtful leadership, boundless energy, big-sky thinking, clear per-
ceptions, and principled defenses of civil rights, rose in power within 
a transitioning Republican Party—a party she had enthusiastically 
joined in the early 1950s to campaign for Dwight D. Eisenhower, a war 
hero who supported equal rights and programs for the poor and elderly 
while empowering state and local governments. This was the party 
that Hillman embraced. 
 You will read about how, as a party moderate, she encouraged 
women	to	run	for	political	office	and	supported	their	efforts,	worked	
hard to increase the political participation of African Americans in  
3the party, and engaged and garnered the support of organized labor 
for candidates who shared her beliefs. Hillman was able to accomplish 
these goals because of her ability to understand the linkages among, 
across,	and	between	groups;	build	and	mobilize	coalitions;	and	find	 
consensus	on	issues	of	mutual	benefit	to	all	parties—all	while	 
encouraging a spirit of cooperation.
 You will read about her knack for identifying individuals she  
believed would make good, balanced leaders and her tireless work  
to elevate them to positions of great power, leading some to dub her  
a kingmaker. You will read about her concerns for the moral, social, 
and political implications of religious beliefs; her passion for certain 
political issues that were not often shared by those in her party; and 
her sadness over having dedicated much of her life to a party that  
she came to believe had abandoned her.
 It is a story about how—through her warmth; kindness; and passion 
for social, political, and economic justice—she worked to create a more 
fair and equitable world for all people. Her clarity of thought, vision, 
and commitment, and her dedication and ability to will into being  
that which others may not have imagined possible makes her story  
an important study in leadership, civic engagement, politics, and  
government—in any context. 
 That is what you will read within these pages. Here is what you 
will not: that at the same time that she was dedicating her life to 
public service in the political realm, Hillman also was giving her time, 
energy, leadership, and service to causes in her beloved Pittsburgh. 
 As she was working with leaders in the African American commu-
nity to engage with the Republican Party during the 1950s and ’60s, 
Hillman also was seeking to involve more African American people  
in leadership within the city’s civic organizations and brokering board 
memberships of Whites in traditionally African American organizations 
just as she had joined the boards of the Anna B. Heldman Community 
Center (later the Hill House Association) and the Urban League of 
Greater Pittsburgh. Because of her presence in the African American 
4community, she garnered support, approval, and the community’s  
trust. She did this not by saying she cared about the community but  
by showing that she cared. 
 Throughout her life, she has sought to take on not just national and  
local issues that she felt passionate about but also those that were,  
in fact, quite controversial. This was never more apparent than during 
the	1970s,	a	decade	that	saw	a	great	increase	in	the	influence	of	the	
women’s movement. Women’s roles changed profoundly with the enact-
ment of key legislation and court decisions—the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Act, Title IX, Roe v. Wade, President Lyndon Johnson's 
Executive Order 11246 prohibiting employment discrimination based  
on gender, and the passage of the Equal Rights Amendment by Congress—
all fueling the growing surge of feminism that swept the country and  
the globe. 
 Women witnessed the advancement of their gender in positions  
of political power on the world stage as they became heads of state 
from Israel to Argentina, and the number and diversity of women 
elected	to	public	office	in	the	United	States	also	increased.	(Hillman	
was elected by her peers in Pennsylvania to the position of Republican 
national committeewoman in 1975, a position she would hold for 21 
years.) These were exciting and challenging times for women. They 
entered the workforce in greater numbers, asserted their rights to jobs, 
demanded equal pay for equal work, pushed for quality education,  
and	for	the	first	time	in	history	surpassed	men	in	college	enrollment.		
 Like the majority of her party, Hillman had long supported the 
reproductive rights of women and other women’s rights issues, and it 
saddened her deeply when the Republican Party, at its 1980 conven-
tion, abandoned support of the Equal Rights Amendment. Undaunted, 
she	remained	fiercely	committed	to	the	issue,	joining	and	supporting	
organizations such as the Interfaith Alliance, which challenged bigotry, 
hatred, and intolerance, and the Republican Majority for Choice, which 
supported the party’s traditional principles that it saw as consonant 
with a philosophy of inclusion and tolerance on social issues, including 
protection of reproductive rights.
5 Throughout the time that she was leaning into her work to support 
women’s rights, she was taking a bold and proactive stand against 
intolerance and bigotry by championing critical social justice causes, 
often	as	part	of	nonprofit	boards	within	her	Pittsburgh	community.	 
She and her family gave generously to support these organizations as well. 
 But then there are the actions that she took that only a few know 
about. Take, for example, the story of a man who in the early 1980s 
was stricken with HIV/AIDS. Already beginning to become very ill, the 
man also was about to lose his house in the Shadyside neighborhood  
of Pittsburgh. Hillman sprang into action, trying to persuade a church 
to purchase the house but eventually purchasing it herself so that the 
man could continue to have a place to live. Over the next few years, 
this three-story building became a place for other people with HIV/AIDS 
to live, giving them a safe, loving environment at a time when so little 
support could be found.
 The Shadyside home became an early, informal hospice center for 
HIV/AIDS patients where they and their families were treated with 
dignity and respect in an environment of compassionate care. Hillman 
met with patients and family members, dropping by with meals, a kind 
ear, encouraging words, and emotional support. Through her active 
involvement and leadership, she gave others permission to do the same. 
It should come as no surprise that when, in 1985, the Pittsburgh AIDS 
Task	Force	was	founded,	Hillman	was	one	of	its	first	volunteers.
 Hillman began to shift her focus from national politics to addressing 
more of the needs of her home community once she stepped down from 
the Republican National Committee. She spearheaded the Save Our 
Summers project in 2004 with Pittsburgh City Council member Sala 
Udin and The Pittsburgh Foundation, raising the funds needed to keep 
the city’s pools open; she collaborated on the Neighbor-Aid fund in 2008 
with The Pittsburgh Foundation, the United Way of Allegheny County, 
other foundations, and the Allegheny County Department of Human 
Services to strengthen the region’s safety net for families and individuals 
in hardship as a result of the economic downturn; and she instituted 
6the Pennsylvania Center for Women and Politics at Chatham University, 
which encourages women to get involved as political leaders. Each of 
these speaks to her pioneering spirit and desire to advance the quality 
and equity of life for the citizens of her beloved Pittsburgh region.
 In some civic efforts, Hillman clearly served in a leadership capacity, 
as she did in her work as cochair of the K–12 Team of the Pittsburgh 
Public Schools. Here she worked to assist the superintendent and 
school board in creating a student-centered program focused on overall 
improved student academic achievement in math, literacy, and science; 
building a world-class high school performing arts program; and assisting 
school leadership as it went through the painful process of downsizing 
the district—all consistent with her belief that educating our children  
is the most important thing we can do for our home region. 
 She also cochaired (with then U.S. Steel chair and CEO David  
Roderick)	a	committee	charged	with	addressing	the	city’s	dire	fiscal	
problems. Working quickly, the committee outlined a number of  
strategies	for	addressing	the	fiscal	problems	that	led	to	budget	cuts	
and the creation of state-appointed oversight boards. Years later,  
Hillman	wrote	an	article	that	reflected	on	the	lessons	learned	from	 
this work, calling for Republicans and Democrats to work together  
to	find	the	solution	to	a	new	set	of	financial	issues.	 
 Her words are paraphrased here: 
	 •	 Know	that	change	usually	comes	slowly.
	 •	 Recognize	the	importance	of	the	city	and	the	fact	that	 
  we all are in this together.
	 •	 Acknowledge	the	important	and	good	work	of	our	city	 
	 	 and	state	officials.
	 •	 Put	every	option	on	the	table	and	avoid	taking	positions	 
  that you cannot back out of. 
	 •	 Be	reasonable	and	willing	to	compromise.
7	 •	 Insist	that	key	decision	makers,	especially	our	legislative	leaders, 
   Republicans and Democrats, are engaged in the discussions  
	 	 from	start	to	finish.			 	 	 	
	 •	 And	finally,	realize	that	if	we	don’t	learn	from	our	past	 
  experiences, we will surely repeat past mistakes.1  
 What I read in her article is a skilled social actor at work, inducing  
cooperation. I also see the wisdom borne of an openness to experience,  
the willingness and courage to become involved and to never be a  
spectator, especially—even—when it may not be the easiest thing to  
do, the popular thing to do, or the most politically appetizing thing  
to do but what you know in your heart is the right thing to do.
 This inclination to act led her to launch and win campaigns not only 
for	elected	officials	but	also	for	equality	and	civil	rights.	It	drove	her	to	
create and advance social, educational, and professional opportunities 
for those at the margins and to make great contributions to the arts, 
sciences, and humanities. Her story inspires others to be more and do 
more—to live with intention, courage, and hope. Through her actions, 
she expands our own sense of what one person can do and our ability  
to support it in others. 
 Author Marianne Williamson said, “Our deepest fear is not that  
we are inadequate. Our deepest fear is that we are powerful beyond 
measure. It is our light, not our darkness, that most frightens us. …  
And as we let our own light shine, we unconsciously give other people 
permission to do the same.” This, to me, is the essence of Hillman’s  
nature and her generative gift to us all. 
 –Terry Miller, director, University of Pittsburgh Institute of Politics
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C H A P T E R  O N E
I n t r o d u c t i o n
	 This	is	a	study	of	a	woman	raised	in	privilege	but	not	defined	by	 
it.	Born	before	World	War	II,	Elsie	Hilliard	Hillman	defied	the	conven-
tions of her time to become a leader in the rough-and-tumble world of 
party politics. 
 For more than 40 years, Elsie Hillman devoted her working hours 
to the Republican Party, rising to the highest position in its volunteer 
ranks and ultimately becoming known as a kingmaker for her role in  
selecting and electing candidates, including President George H.W. 
Bush, U.S. Senator H. John Heinz III, and Pennsylvania Governors 
Dick Thornburgh and Tom Ridge. When she retired from party leader-
ship in 1996, it would cap two decades as a leader of the party at local, 
state, and national levels. 
 The arc of Hillman’s career in politics describes the skilled social 
actor—a term sociologists use to describe those rare individuals who  
can “empathetically relate to the situations of other people and, in doing 
so, are able to provide those people with reasons to cooperate. Their 
sense	of	efficacy	comes	not	from	some	narrow	conception	of	self-interest,	
but from the act of inducing cooperation and helping others attain ends.” 2
 What makes her political life all the more interesting is that Elsie 
Hillman deployed her skills within an institution that was undergoing 
a historical shift. She joined the Republican Party because she saw it 
as a means of working for what she valued most: moderation, tolerance, 
and civil rights. But as she worked to bring more women and African 
Americans	into	the	party	and	to	find	common	ground,	social	conserva-
tives, including the religious right, were growing in strength, pulling 
the Republican Party away from the center of the political spectrum.
This study looks at how Hillman used her skills to choose, promote, 
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and	elect	moderate	candidates	and	to	fight	against	the	narrowing	of	
the party platform. It begins by tracking her rise within the party 
structure from the time she began working for Dwight D. Eisenhower’s 
campaign for president to her election to the Republican National  
Committee (RNC). It then summarizes the research on the skilled 
social actor to provide a framework for viewing her political work and 
provides	five	cases	to	illustrate	her	strategies	and	tactics	on	behalf	of	
moderate Republican candidates. The study concludes by looking at 
the context within which Hillman was working for moderation: She 
happened to join the party at a time when the nation was in one of its 
least	polarized	periods	and	when	the	influence	of	religiously	motivated	
activists upon the Republican Party was at a historic low. Hillman had 
joined	a	party	that	reflected	what	she	believed.	Over	the	decades,	the	
party drifted away from her and other passionate moderates. 
 By the time she retired from party politics, Hillman was deeply 
frustrated. She would write to one RNC leader, “After 50 years of making 
the Republican party the primary focus of my life and of the family, I 
am deeply saddened. ... I hope that you can hear the pain in my voice 
as well as the hope in my heart.”3
A note on citations
 This text follows Chicago Manual of Style citation format for end-
notes with the exception of quotes, direct or indirect, procured from 
interviews	conducted	specifically	for	this	book.
 A separate listing of interviews is contained after the endnotes on 
page 125. If a direct or indirect quote in this book is attributed to an 
individual without an endnote number, additional information can be 
found in this list of interviews.
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C H A P T E R  T w O
A  M o d e r n  R e p u b l i c a n
The party she joined
 Although she was born in a part of Pennsylvania where Democrats 
outnumbered Republicans three to one, there was no question that  
Elsie Mead Hilliard Hillman would register as a Republican. Her father, 
Thomas Jones Hilliard, was ardently anti-Roosevelt. Her sister already 
was active in party politics in Rhode Island, and Hillman had married 
into a Republican family.
	 But	family	affiliation	was	just	part	of	what	influenced	her.	Republi-
cans were the party of General Dwight D. Eisenhower, the war hero  
who stood for the principles she cared about: tolerance and equal rights. 
Ike	was	an	inspiring,	progressive	figure	for	Hillman.	“He	was	an	exciting	
candidate	for	many	of	us	because	he	was	the	first	presidential	candidate 
from either party who had appeared in many years as the people’s choice 
rather	than	one	chosen	in	smoke-filled	rooms,”	Hillman	said.4
 Hillman also joined the party because it welcomed women and ensured 
them more than a token place in its structure. It was the Republicans 
whose national platform had included support of the Equal Rights 
Amendment (ERA) at each convention since 1940 and whose national 
committee had passed a rule guaranteeing that half of its members on 
every committee would be women. When Mrs. Medill McCormick wrote 
in the 1922 Congressional Digest about the number of women joining the 
Republican Party, she reminded readers that it was Republicans who 
had championed the causes important to many women by pioneering  
the National Child Labor Law, compulsory school attendance, and  
protection for widows and single mothers through “mother’s pensions” 
(the precursor to public assistance for families with dependent children).5
 And then there was women’s suffrage. Republican Senator S.C. 
Pomeroy	of	Kansas	introduced	the	first	resolution	for	suffrage	in	1868,	

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and 60 percent of Republicans voted for it, while 100 percent of Demo-
crats voted against it. The Republican Campaign Text-Book of 1920 
made the point: It was the Republicans who had welcomed women  
“into full participation in the affairs of government and the activities  
of the Republican Party.”6 
 It was not that the leaders of the Republican Party saw the role  
of women, civil rights, or other “social issues” uniformly. From the Civil 
War forward, the party contained a tension between conservatives and 
moderates	that	was	only	magnified	after	Roosevelt’s	New	Deal,	when	
party members divided over whether to reject all or just some programs 
and had internal debates over tariffs and the value placed on reducing 
the national debt. As political writer Craig Shirley characterized the 
division, “the Party had housed two competing personalities, with  
conservatives battling liberals in a pretty much perpetual state  
of equilibrium.”7 
 The 1948 presidential primary framed the differences clearly.  
Senator Robert A. Taft of Ohio had the support of the Republican 
Party’s traditional conservatives and possessed a “ferocious loyalty to 
his	party	and	distrust	of	the	eastern	financial	establishment,	which	he	
suspected of collaboration with the New Deal and encouragement of 
intervention overseas,” writes historian Nicol Rae. “Taft further feared 
that the New Deal’s centralization of government and intervention in 
economic	affairs	would	stifle	America’s	exceptional	‘individualism.’	”8  
In contrast, New York Governor Thomas E. Dewey, who led the Repub-
lican Party’s moderate wing, drew his support largely from the eastern 
part of the country. Dewey had a practical bent, certain that Republicans 
would lose if they opposed all of the New Deal’s programs. He said that 
if Republicans tried to return to their positions of the 1920s, opposing  
Social	Security,	farm	price	supports,	and	old	age	benefits,	“you	can	bury 
the Republican Party as the deadest pigeon in the United States.” 9 
Dewey won the Republican primary but lost narrowly to Harry S.  
Truman in the general election.
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 In 1951, when Eisenhower announced that he would run in the  
Republican primary, Taft already was busy lining up delegates and  
was poised as a front-runner by the end of the year. But his opposition  
to many domestic programs and his isolationist views made even his  
supporters wonder if Taft could be for something. Eisenhower was no  
fan of the New Deal, but he thought that opposing popular programs  
like Social Security could cause “lasting damage to the Republican  
cause. ... He had little regard for Democrats and liberals, but he was 
equally scathing about the right wing of his own party, which he  
believed was impractical and often reckless,” writes Lewis Gould in 
Grand Old Party.10
 Eisenhower would be a “Modern Republican”—a term he meant  
to convey inclusiveness. (One historian wrote that Eisenhower had  
considered different catchphrases to indicate the values of the party  
he wanted to lead, including the more clear but cumbersome “party  
of justice for all the people.”11) But his moderate policies and convincing  
1952 election victory did not translate into success in the midterm  
congressional elections. The Republicans lost control of Congress and  
endured further losses in 1958. They would not control the Senate  
again for nearly three decades or the House of Representatives for  
four decades. “Had Eisenhower’s approach to the Republicans proved 
successful at the polls for candidates other than himself, he might have 
persuaded his Republican critics of the merits of his view of the electorate. 
Instead, during the Eisenhower years, conservatism stirred and then 
gained momentum,” writes Gould.12 The period saw the advent of the  
conservative magazine National Review and the founding of the John 
Birch Society—which marked the growing strength of conservatism  
during the 1950s. “Their presence did not yet threaten Richard Nixon’s 
control of the 1960 presidential nomination, but the tension between 
Eisenhower’s brand of conservatism and the more ideological brand  
on the right foreshadowed the party’s struggles in the 1960s,” according  
to Gould.13
14
 This was the context in which the young Hillman joined the Repub-
lican Party. Her own memories of the time are tied to her excitement 
at campaigning for Eisenhower, barely aware of the splinters within 
the party. When her uncle by marriage, Ernest Hillman (an Allegheny 
County commissioner), called her up on the telephone to say, “Elsie,  
I’m heading up the campaign for Senator Taft and I hear you just 
signed up to volunteer for Eisenhower,” she responded, “Well, isn’t  
that wonderful? One of us in the family is going to win!” She says today, 
“He never let me forget that. I mean, how innocent I was.”
 Hillman would be a quick study, developing the skills of an effective 
social actor but never the cynicism of a political operative. In this, she 
remained true to her upbringing and mindful of her mentor, U.S. Senator 
Hugh Scott, who reinforced her inclination to see the best in people.
Early influences
 Elsie Hillman and her brothers and sister were “taught from the 
beginning that among our responsibilities was one to our community” 
and that “by working in concert with others, we might help the  
community rise.”14 Hillman said that her mother, Marianna Talbott 
Hilliard, had a beautiful spirit and gave her children the example of 
how to work for the broader good. Hilliard’s work included leading 
the local volunteers in spotting aircraft over Pittsburgh during World 
War	II,	serving	on	the	boards	of	several	nonprofit	organizations,	and	
heading the citywide effort to raise money to buy mobile kitchens and 
hospital equipment for people in England who had been bombed by the 
Germans. When she was a teenager, Hillman began volunteering, too. 
She cleaned instruments for surgeries at Eye and Ear Hospital in  
Pittsburgh, sold War Bonds, and knitted socks for soldiers.
 Hillman’s mother also gave her children an appreciation for the 
importance of faith in one’s life, a faith that did not reduce the world  
to good versus evil. Hilliard was a Christian Scientist, believing that 
anyone can be redeemed and that God’s work is experienced here and now. 
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Like many adherents, she preferred to rely on God, not medicine, to 
heal physical maladies, but she still made sure her children had regular 
medical care. While it pained her each time she had to take them to 
see a doctor or give them their pills, Hilliard did so anyway. From this, 
Hillman learned that “sometimes we have to give up part of ourselves” 
for others.15
 Her mother must have been tried in smaller ways, too. Hillman 
was a “high-spirited” student at the Ellis School who skirted the rules 
of 1940s Pittsburgh. “I was in terrible trouble. ... I was always in 
trouble,” said Hillman. “I remember riding on the back of a motorcycle 
with my beau at the time. He kept going around the school, and Miss 
Ellis came out and rang the bell. She’d stand on the corner of Ellsworth 
Avenue and shake this bell for everybody to go in after lunch, and here 
I was, riding around on this motorcycle.”
 Hillman loved the friendships and fun of school but was less inter-
ested in the classwork. So that she could focus more on schoolwork, she 
transferred to Chatham Hall in Virginia and then to the Ethel Walker 
School in Connecticut, which was within a short train ride of her aunt, 
a “wonderful woman” who seemed to understand her independence and 
spirit. This aunt would call the school and tell the headmistress that 
her son, Albert, who was in the U.S. Marine Corps (true), was being 
sent overseas that following week (not true) and ask if Elsie could please 
come to New York for the weekend, because she really was more like 
his sister than his cousin. Sprung from school, Elsie Hilliard would go 
to New York and have a great time in the city with her friends. “About 
three weeks later, my crazy aunt would call up again, and she’d say, 
‘Albert just got reassigned and now he’s really leaving.’ So I’d go back 
down to New York.”16
 After she graduated, Hillman went to Westminster Choir College  
in Princeton, N.J., to study piano and voice. (Her grandmother, Katherine 
Houk Talbott, founded the college, which now is part of Rider University.) 
By this time, she had fallen in love with Henry Hillman, a U.S. Navy 
pilot stationed at Floyd Bennett Field in Brooklyn, N.Y. She had met 
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him when she was a teenager as he was “in the same crowd” as her older 
sister. When Henry Hillman learned that he was soon to be sent overseas, 
he called up Elsie’s parents and asked if they could get married earlier 
than planned. They were wed in May 1945, when Elsie was 19.
 The Hillmans moved to a military base in Dallas, Texas, to wait for 
Henry to be deployed again; their plan was that after he shipped out,  
Elsie would go back to college. Those plans changed when the war ended 
that summer. They were able to move back to Pittsburgh, where they 
would raise their four children in the Squirrel Hill section of Pittsburgh 
(in a home with “only one piece of furniture in the whole house the four  
of us weren’t allowed to jump on,” according to their daughter, Audrey 
Hillman Fisher).17
 Henry Hillman went to work for Pittsburgh Coke, one of the companies 
his father, John Hartwell “Hart” Hillman Jr., had rescued from default 
during the Depression and that would help to establish him as one of 
the country’s most successful businessmen. Hart Hillman invested in a 
network of companies that employed thousands, but he was not widely 
recognized in Pittsburgh because he wanted it that way. An employee of 
his	was	quoted	as	saying,	“The	first	thing	Hart	Hillman	said	when	I	went	
to work for him was, ‘You know, I hire public relations people to keep me 
out of the press.’ ”18
 When Henry Hillman took over the company, he also preferred to 
stay out of the limelight. But he had a harder time doing this than his 
father, both because of Elsie Hillman’s involvement in civic affairs and 
politics and his own interest in community and economic development  
in the region. Even as Hillman was multiplying the value of the company 
his father had built, he devoted time to serving with the Urban Redevel-
opment Authority of Pittsburgh and as president of the Allegheny  
Conference on Community Development, where he “shifted its emphasis 
entirely—from rebuilding the physical city of Pittsburgh to rehabilitating 
the human one,” according to a 1969 Forbes magazine article.19 With 
Henry Hillman’s support, the Allegheny Conference began to invest  
in training and business development programs in African American 
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communities, including Operation Dig, founded by civil rights leader 
Nate Smith. Smith would become a friend of the Hillmans and a political 
ally of Elsie Hillman.
The influence of Hugh Scott
 While Elsie Hillman’s upbringing may have led her to seek ways 
to be part of the community outside her social circle, it was Republican 
U.S. Senator Hugh Scott of Pennsylvania who showed her how to 
apply her natural gifts in politics. He encouraged her to take on ever-
higher leadership roles in the party, was her advisor on key decisions, 
and guided her in developing her political skills. 
 Scott and Hillman had met during the Eisenhower campaign, and 
it	was	shortly	after	that	when	Scott	identified	Hillman	as	a	rising	star	
in the party, according to Martin Hamberger, who volunteered for 
Scott and became his chief of staff in the 1960s. It was Scott who urged 
Hillman to run for chair of Allegheny County’s Republican Party and 
for mayor. (She would be elected chair of the party but decline each  
opportunity	to	run	for	public	office.)	“Elsie	was	such	a	dynamo	of	activity	
and brightness—the kind of person that you could immediately identify 
with as a leader,” said Hamberger. “She has a great capacity for pulling 
together disparate threads and weaving the tapestry. And I think that’s 
what she did politically, always recognizing that any organization is a 
function of the people, what they think, ideas, and how you convince 
them that what you’re trying to do is the best way to achieve a better 
life for them.”
 Hillman could not have had a mentor whose abilities and beliefs 
were so closely consonant with her own. Scott was a moderate Republi-
can	who	first	won	election	to	Congress	in	1940	and	rose	quickly	in	the	
party’s ranks to become the head of the Republican National Committee 
(RNC) and a leader on the national scene, helping to engineer the  
Republicans’ Draft Eisenhower campaign in 1952 and serving as a 
political advisor to both Eisenhower and Richard Nixon. Scott won  
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his Senate seat in 1958 in what The Washington Post later called  
“a triumph for Pennsylvania moderates over the Republican right 
wing.”20 In 1962, he showed his moderate stripes again by supporting  
William Scranton as the Republican candidate for Pennsylvania gover-
nor. In doing this, he had to defy the state party leadership, which had  
selected a much more conservative candidate. He also supported New 
York Governor Nelson Rockefeller in the 1964 Republican presidential 
primary and, after Rockefeller withdrew, helped to lead the effort to 
draft Pennsylvania Governor Scranton for president in the hope of 
derailing the campaign of conservative Republican U.S. Senator Barry 
Goldwater of Arizona.
 Scott’s colleagues would elect him party whip in 1969 after he had 
“united liberals, moderates, and a few conservatives with whom he had 
close	personal	ties,”	and	he	would	rise	to	Senate	Republican	floor	leader	
with the support of that same coalition.21 
 Of his accomplishments during his 36 years in Congress, Scott  
was most proud of his sponsorship of key civil rights legislation.  
Scott’s positions on this issue, as well as his optimistic disposition, 
deeply affected Hillman’s own political perspective. Scott’s innate desire 
to ascribe honorable motives to people was crushed by the president he 
trusted. “His most bitter disappointment was that Richard Nixon had 
lied to him” about his involvement in Watergate, according to Hillman.
Moving from volunteer to activist
 It was in 1960 that the 34-year-old Hillman decided she had to have  
a talk with Allegheny County Republican chair Ed Flaherty. In all  
of her time spent volunteering for the party, she said she had seen  
“no Black participation and no minorities in the campaigns at all.”  
She went to party headquarters in downtown Pittsburgh and said to 
Flaherty,	“Could	I	see	your	files?	I’d	like	to	volunteer	to	help	work	on	
getting	more	minorities	involved.”	Those	files	showed	that	there	were	
just a handful of Black Republicans in the county who were active in  
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the party. Flaherty suggested that Hillman meet with Wendell Freeland,  
who shared her concern. Freeland, a Tuskegee Airman during World  
War II, had moved to Pittsburgh from Baltimore, Md., and was working  
as	an	attorney	in	the	district	attorney’s	office	(which,	Freeland	said,	 
“always had one Negro” on its staff).
 Freeland and Hillman arranged to meet at the Union Grill in Pittsburgh. 
Freeland remembers saying to her, “I’m a Negro, but I want to be as  
much in the 14th Ward [Squirrel Hill, a predominantly White area of the 
city] as I am in the 5th Ward [the Hill District, a predominantly African  
American area of the city] and for you to be as much in the 5th as you are 
in the 14th.’” Hillman told him, “Of course!”  
 Freeland and Hillman began to work together on the Nixon presidential 
campaign in 1960, after Flaherty appointed them the county’s cochairs.  
They worked every day that year for the campaign, traveling to Republican 
ward committee meetings in the city’s varied neighborhoods, both Black  
and White, recruiting volunteers and training them to be poll watchers.  
Public sPeaker in the making 
 As outgoing as she seemed, it took years for Hillman to feel comfortable 
meeting face to face with people in authority or giving speeches. “I used to lie 
about having to sit down to make a speech because I would shake so when I 
stood up,” Hillman said. 
 She laughed when she remembered a meeting in the 1960s when she 
was so nervous that she hyperventilated. Hillman had traveled to Washington, 
D.C., to meet with a venerable figure in the party, Val Washington, who had 
been a key advisor to Eisenhower and was the first director of minority affairs 
at the RNC. She wanted to learn what he was doing at the national level to 
expand Black participation in the party and had just found the courage to  
utter, “What are you doing about the Negro vote?” when she passed out.  
When she recovered, she found that Washington had come to her rescue.  
“He and I became fast friends because he had to tote me to the hospital,  
get the ambulance, and go to the emergency room,” said Hillman.
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They also spent days organizing ward-by-ward TV parties throughout 
the Black community so that people could gather to watch the Nixon- 
John F. Kennedy debates. Unfortunately for Nixon, those audiences saw  
a man who looked nervous and less vigorous and presidential than did 
Kennedy; in Freeland’s words, Nixon simply “screwed up.” 
 Those TV parties may not have persuaded many Black people to  
vote for Nixon, but Hillman and Freeland’s work in bringing baseball 
player Jackie Robinson to Pittsburgh made an impression on the Black 
community and added to the pair’s growing stature within the local  
Republican Party. It was late in the Nixon-Lodge campaign when  
the two organized Robinson’s visit with leaders in the city’s African 
American neighborhoods. This succeeded in getting the attention they 
sought, but not without their having to steer over the racial shoals of  
the time. First, they had to get Robinson safely into the city. “We met 
Robinson at the airport on a bus, and we didn’t want the bus to have  
only Black people,” said Freeland, so Hillman and other friends of theirs 
recruited White people to ride on the bus with Robinson and other Black  
supporters of Nixon.
 Freeland said that when it was time for Robinson to leave, the  
Pittsburgh	Police	officer	who	was	supposed	to	drive	him	to	the	airport	
said he could not go beyond the city’s border. So Hillman drove Robinson 
to the airport in her Mercury station wagon.
Building a network in the Black community  
 Hillman’s credibility with the Black community grew after she was 
appointed volunteer chair of the Republican Committee of Allegheny 
County and chose Jessie Hewlett as the paid staff person for the organ-
ization’s	downtown	office.	Hewlett,	a	Black	woman,	had	worked	for	 
W.P.	“Bill”	Young,	a	Republican	leader	who	later	became	the	first	chair	
of the Negro Republican Council and secretary of the Pennsylvania  
Department of Labor and Industry under Governor Scranton. “Jessie 
was someone Elsie could trust and who would trust her,” said Freeland. 
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But Hillman’s choice angered some White people in the party, who refused 
to	come	into	an	office	with	a	Black	woman	on	staff.	“There	were	cross	
raisings, nearly,” according to Freeland. 
 Hillman and Freeland persisted, bringing more Black people into 
the Republican Party and onto the leadership of Pittsburgh’s civic  
organizations, along with bringing more White people onto the boards 
of traditionally African American organizations. One of the most respected 
of these groups was the Anna B. Heldman Community Center, now Hill 
House Association. It was through her board work for the organization 
that Hillman met a number of young Black ministers who would join 
her in civic and political work for the Hill District. “They knew from my 
work with the Hill House that my interests lay in their communities 
and that I wasn’t just trying to exploit them for political purposes,”  
said Hillman.22 
mammoth rally
 Hillman organized a rally for gubernatorial candidate William Scranton on 
October 24, 1962, in downtown Pittsburgh. “We had to really do something to 
make it different,” recalled Hillman. “So we got the Civic Arena, and Eisenhower 
agreed to come and Jimmy Stewart agreed to come. We brought in people from 
all the surrounding counties on buses. The traffic jam! I just couldn’t believe 
that all those people were coming to the Civic Arena. We filled it to overflowing. 
 “The Democrats had said, ‘They can’t find enough Republicans to fill a 
telephone booth.’ So we put a telephone booth on the stage of the Civic Arena. 
And Jimmy Stewart got in it and said ‘Hallo. I’m calling the Democrat Party from 
a telephone booth in the Civic Arena. I’m the only one in the booth, but there 
are 17,000 people in the audience.’ ” 
 In spite of driving snow, this was the largest crowd in the arena’s history  
at the time; the Pittsburgh Courier headline read: “17,000 Cheer Ike, GOP 
Nominees at Mammoth Rally.”
 Hillman notes, “That’s when people started taking me seriously and we 
thought, ‘Maybe we could do some other things.’ ”
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 William Scranton remembered calling upon Hillman and Freeland  
in 1962 to tap the Black political network they had begun to develop,  
“going building to building and house to house on the Hill in Pittsburgh” 
with them, according to Scranton. “No Republican had ever done that. 
And we went to the Pittsburgh Courier and spoke with them. In Phila-
delphia, the only way I got anywhere with Black people was through the 
churches. But this one [Pittsburgh] was a real political organization.”   
 Spending time in Black communities and with civil rights leaders like 
Reverend LeRoy Patrick, Reverend Elmer Williams, and Nate Smith led 
Hillman	to	find	a	deeper	motivation	for	her	work	in	politics.	“I	began	to	
understand what it was like on the other side of the street from where  
I had lived,” said Hillman in a speech she gave in 1998. “I began to un-
derstand the passion and the stamina that drives leaders for civil rights. 
My politics had led me into a new challenge, which was to try to impact 
life in the inner cities for both old and young people, to try to make the 
whole community meet its obligations toward the continuing problems of 
health, education, and safety for the less privileged and the most needy.”23 
Conservatives vs. moderates at the 1964 convention
 The tensions between moderates and conservatives during Eisen-
hower’s years continued during the 1960s. Nicol Rae, author of The  
Decline and Fall of the Liberal Republicans, writes that, during this  
period, supporters of Taft from the Midwest joined with conservatives 
from the Sun Belt, many of whom were development speculators and  
promoters who were not loyal to the Republican Party establishment. 
This left the “liberals of the Eastern seaboard an isolated minority  
with	limited	influence	on	the	future	course	of	the	Republican	Party.”24
 When it came time to nominate a candidate for president in 1964, 
this new conservative coalition favored Goldwater, who had articulated  
a core set of conservative beliefs in his best-selling 1960 book,  
The Conscience of a Conservative. Conservatives of that era found in  
his book a clear argument for their beliefs and what they thought it 
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meant to be a Republican. But it contained an argument for states’ rights 
that, when coupled with Goldwater’s vote against the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, was interpreted by some as code for support of racial segregation, 
even though Goldwater had argued against segregation elsewhere. 
 Moderates in the Republican Party were equally passionate about 
Rockefeller, Goldwater’s major competitor during the primary race.  
This moderate versus conservative battle came down to the primary 
race in California, where Rockefeller was ahead in the polls. But his 
campaign was upended by a single event. “On Friday, the Field Poll 
in California showed Nelson 10 points ahead of Goldwater,” recalled 
Scranton. “On Saturday morning, Nelson Rockefeller Jr. was born.  
And the thing exactly reversed, with the Field Poll showing Goldwater  
10 points ahead of Rockefeller. Incredible. It had brought to light 
Nelson’s divorce and his family problem.” That “family problem” was 
Rockefeller’s	second	marriage	to	a	woman	whose	first	four	children	were	 
in her former husband’s custody. The birth of Margaretta and Nelson 
Rockefeller’s son reawakened public opinion against their relationship.
	 With	just	five	weeks	until	the	Republican	National	Convention	in	
San Francisco, moderates quickly searched for an alternative to draft  
as their presidential candidate, not only because they feared that  
Goldwater could not win the race for president but also because he 
would drag down vote totals of state and local candidates. Through  
the urging of Senator Scott, they turned to Scranton, who had shown 
he could win strong support from both Democrats and Republicans  
in his statewide race. 
 Scranton agreed to run because he was disgusted by Goldwater’s 
stance on civil rights. “When I ran for president, I did so on the issue 
of civil rights,” said Scranton. “Barry Goldwater was a nice guy and I 
don’t think he was a racist, but for some damn reason, he voted twice 
against the most important bill we’ve had in modern times, the Civil 
Rights Act.”
 Scranton dove into the race, visiting 25 states in 25 days. To give 
him the boost he needed to compete against Goldwater, moderates 
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hoped to persuade Eisenhower to speak at the convention on Scranton’s 
behalf. Hillman, who attended that convention and was involved in the 
brief effort to draft Scranton, remembered their game plan: “Scranton 
was supposed to have had the endorsement of Eisenhower. This was 
going to happen on a given night, with Eisenhower making a speech. 
Once the word went out that Eisenhower had endorsed him, then  
everybody knew what calls they were supposed to make. It did not  
happen. I called up Bud Humphrey in Cleveland, whose father was 
George Humphrey [the secretary of the treasury under Eisenhower]. 
His wife was part of a network for Scranton that was out there.  
I learned that George Humphrey [a strong supporter of Goldwater]  
talked Eisenhower out of doing it.”25
 News accounts of the time show that Goldwater’s people controlled 
the convention, shutting out Scranton and Rockefeller supporters.  
Hillman said, “The Goldwater people wouldn’t let us move our people 
into the convention hall.”
 For Black Republicans, the convention was a horror. Black delegates 
were “shoved, pushed, spat on, and cursed with a liberal sprinkling of 
racial epithets,” wrote Taylor Branch in his book Pillar of Fire: America 
in the King Years 1963–65. W.P. Young, the African American labor 
secretary of Pennsylvania, was beset by Goldwater delegates who  
“harassed	him	to	the	point	of	setting	his	suit	jacket	on	fire	with	a	 
cigarette.”26 Jackie Robinson was at the convention, too, and wrote  
in his biography, “It was a terrible hour for the relatively few Black 
delegates who were present. Distinguished in their communities,  
identified	with	the	cause	of	Republicanism,	an	extremely	unpopular	
cause among Blacks, they had been served notice that the party they 
had fought for considered them just another bunch of ‘niggers.’...  
One bigot from one of the Deep South states actually threw acid on a 
Black delegate’s suit jacket and burned it. ... A new breed of Republicans 
had taken over the GOP.”27
	 Hillman	recalled	that	a	fire	erupted	on	the	floor	of	the	convention,	
something Scranton described in an interview: “When the actual voting 
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was going on at the convention, there was a ramp on the side that people 
going to the dais could go up. And Mary [Scranton’s wife] went up it  
every night. I watched her on television as she started up the ramp. 
And	it	broke	into	fire.	I	thought	she	was	consumed.”
 Scranton had entered the primary at the last minute “to make  
everybody realize that not all Republicans were anti-Black. ... The 
thing that I worried about terribly was that if Goldwater were the  
candidate, because of his stand on the Civil Rights Act, he would win 
the solid Deep South. And he did. From then on, I thought, the Repub-
lican Party was going to become the White supremacy party. And it is, 
in the South. Let’s be honest about it.”
 “That convention sure did mobilize people like me,” said Hillman. 
“You were either going to stay in politics and try to change things or 
get out because it was just so bad.”28
Ascending the ladder
 In 1966, Elsie Hillman decided to run for the elected position of vice 
chair of the Republican Committee of Allegheny County. 
 Hillman knew that she was ready to lead. She had served as volun-
teer chair, secretary of the party, and chair of the 14th Ward Republican 
Committee (the only woman among the 32 ward chairs at the time) and 
had organized one large-scale event after another. She believed that 
the leaders of the more conservative wing of the Republican Party in 
Allegheny County, including its highest-ranking elected leader, District 
Attorney Robert Duggan, would not support her run for vice chair.  
But that would not matter, because the seat was wide open after the 
incumbent, Nelle Dressler, had made public her decision not to run. 
 When the time came to get on the ballot, however, Marian Metro, 
an active party member who enjoyed the backing of conservatives,  
submitted her nominating petition for vice chair. This caught Hillman  
by	surprise,	as	did	the	wrong	time	on	the	clock	in	the	party	office,	which	
led	her	to	think	she	had	more	time	to	file	her	petition	than	she	did. 
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 (Freeland believed that it was turned back purposely to cause her  
to	miss	the	filing	deadline.)	Hillman	quickly	began	organizing	a	write-in	
drive. But Allegheny County party chair George F. Pott barred write-in 
votes, as described in a July 1966 article in The Gettysburg Times, which 
reported	that	this	decision	“drew	criticism	from	an	unofficial	candidate.	
Mrs. Henry L. Hillman, whose name was not on the ballot but who had 
announced she was a candidate for vice-chairman, said her supporters 
could not vote for her because write-in slots on the voting machines were 
sealed. She called Wednesday’s election a ‘sham.’ ”29
 Personalities and philosophy aside, leaders in the party found  
Hillman to be an enigma. She seemed to lack parochial motivations  
like patronage or personal gain. Hillman said, “Nobody really knew me.  
They didn’t know why I was there, what I wanted, even though I didn’t 
want anything. They didn’t understand me at all because I didn’t have 
to	be	going	to	an	office	every	day.	…	So	there	was	tremendous	distrust.”30  
Andy Gleason, who chaired the Cambria County Republican Committee 
and was one of the statewide power brokers in the party, met Hillman 
during this time. He remembered thinking, “Why in the name of heavens 
would somebody like that want to get mixed up in politics?”
 Hillman met the party leaders’ distrust head on by becoming their 
“student and coworker. ... They were often better politicians than I was. 
They could beat me fair and square anytime I tried to take them on.  
If there was a problem, they knew who to call. If we needed a candidate, 
they	could	find	one.	If	we	needed	to	plot	out	a	campaign,	they	knew	 
how to do it.”31
 Hillman said that by the time she ran for the top job in the Repub-
lican Committee of Allegheny County in 1967, “I’d proven that I didn’t 
have two heads and that I could work and that I was on their side.”32  
She was elected chair with overwhelming support from party members, 
becoming	the	first	woman	to	head	a	political	party	in	a	major	urban	area	
and	making	news	locally	and	across	the	state.	In	a	profile	of	her	win	in	
the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Hillman said about the men and women  
of her party, “They are a good, good group. We’ve all worked together. 
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I’ve tried to demonstrate my good intent, too. But I couldn’t do any-
thing without their support.”33 
 Women found inspiration in her victory. Mrs. Mollie Cohen wrote 
to her, “Maybe someday we’ll have a lady in the White House.”34   
Mrs. H.S. Hopkins, who said she was old enough to be Hillman’s 
mother, wrote, “The men say, ‘The women will never get on together.’  
I say to you, ‘Let’s prove that we can.’ ”35 And Sylvia Vogt wrote that 
male committee members had said before Hillman’s election as party 
chair, “I don’t think a woman can handle it. She won’t be forceful 
enough.” Wrote Vogt, “That’s a laugh!!”36
 Among the people who wrote Hillman notes of congratulation on 
this county-level win was this prescient one from John Blewer of Texas 
Gas Transmission, LLC: “It looks to me like we need somebody with 
your campaign technique to help out at the national level.”37
Learning as she led
 Now that she was the elected county chair, Hillman was in a position 
to make this an organization that women and minorities would want  
to	join.	But	she	learned	that	her	job	came	with	one	benefit	that	she	did	
not want: the chance to exercise political patronage.
 It had been a century-old practice in Pennsylvania to reward people 
and groups who had worked to elect the governor with jobs and state 
contracts. “With the governor’s seat went a multitude of state jobs— 
the political coin of the realm,” wrote Dick Thornburgh (who later 
would become governor himself) in 1974.38 Some of these jobs and 
contracts were distributed through the county-level committees of the 
Democratic and Republican parties, and it was the responsibility of  
the chairs of the county committees to allocate them to the faithful.
 Most chairs would seize upon this as the gift it was meant to be:  
a way of cementing their position and linking the local volunteers and 
contributors with the statewide network that supported the election 
of approved party candidates. But for Hillman, it was a necessary evil 
28
borne	of	the	fact	that	a	Republican	governor	was	in	office	at	the	time.	 
“I had all the contracts for the state—every post hole digger and every guy 
who worked on the highway in the summertime, and kids and interns 
and school contracts, like the milk contracts for the state hospitals  
and institutions. All of that had to be approved by the county chair.” 
 She did not like it, but Hillman was practical. She would not crusade 
to change the system, nor would she function as a patronage czar. This 
was just part of the job to be delegated. Instead, she devoted her own 
time to building the base of the party and selecting good candidates. 
She knew she would need someone both to help her in putting together 
a strong organization and to go with her to the union halls, fraternal 
associations, and ethnic clubs where she intended to recruit Republicans, 
so at the recommendation of a colleague, she hired Ollie Thurman to be 
the executive director of the Republican Committee of Allegheny County. 
Thurman, who decided to move back to Pittsburgh from Hawaii for the 
job, had grown up in Pittsburgh and worked for Senator Scott in his 
Pittsburgh	office,	so	he	was	familiar	with	the	Republican	Party	opera-
tions in the county (and also came recommended by the senator).  
In recollecting his work for Hillman during that time, Thurman said,  
“She	had	walked	into	a	disorganized	office,	which	is	putting	it	mildly.	
You’re talking about a party that was a joke. ...You always had one 
county commissioner [seat], just because by law, there had to be at 
least one Republican. But there were no other Republicans winning 
anywhere in the city. ... She took on a thankless job and made the 
party into a real player.”   
 They got to work putting together competitive campaigns for candi-
dates	for	local,	state,	and	federal	offices,	starting	by	picking	a	stronger,	
more diverse set of candidates for state legislative and city elections—
even though they knew the odds were overwhelmingly against them in 
the City of Pittsburgh, where voter registration was three Democrats 
to	every	one	Republican.	Hillman	also	turned	to	a	small	set	of	confidants	
for	help	in	finding	good	candidates.	The	members,	who	would	call	 
themselves the “007s,” included Harold Blaxter, Al Capozzi, Freeland,  
29
Hillman, John McComb, Sheldon Parker, and Thornburgh. The 007s  
met monthly to “plot about where I could go next,” said Hillman.39  
 Thurman said, “Elsie and her group really handpicked the City  
Council candidates, and they were light-years better than any other  
candidates they [the party] had ever had.” They chose a slate of  
“ethnic” candidates for City Council to appeal to Pittsburghers who  
were African American or of Irish, Jewish, Greek, or Italian descent. 
They worked for Raymond Shafer’s successful campaign for governor  
of Pennsylvania and put forward for the U.S. Congress Algia Gary  
(an African American who was a municipal employee) and Thornburgh. 
And they worked for Rockefeller’s 1968 presidential primary campaign, 
organizing a large rally in Pittsburgh. With less enthusiasm, Hillman 
worked for Nixon after Rockefeller lost in the primary.
 Scott and others in the party urged Hillman to run for mayor of  
Pittsburgh during these years, but she decided against it—in spite of her 
young daughter’s encouragement for her to run so that her mother could 
“make Dad the chief of police.” 
	 One	example	of	Hillman’s	growing	influence	was	in	how	she	helped	 
her friend and fellow 007 Thornburgh to become the U.S. attorney for the  
western district of Pennsylvania. Thurman remembers that Scott called  
Hillman and said, “Elsie, they’ve given me 45 minutes to name a candidate, 
otherwise we’re going to lose it and it’s going to go to Duggan’s guy.”  
(Duggan wanted the position to go to an assistant district attorney.)40  
“We had already agreed that Thornburgh would be the one she wanted  
to nominate, so she said ‘Okay, we’ll get hold of him,’ ” said Thurman. 
“We	called	his	office	and	they	told	us	that	Thornburgh	was	on	the	bus	 
going home. So I jumped in the car and ran up and met the bus in  
Squirrel Hill, and he got off the bus and I said, ‘You’ve got to decide  
right now. You don’t have time to talk to your wife or anyone. Do you 
want to be U.S. attorney?’ And he said yes.” 
 Thurman said that it was through the “grunt work” of this period  
that Hillman earned her stripes and “got tough.” It was under Hillman’s  
leadership that the county committee was transformed into a true  
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organization focused on candidate recruitment; local organizing; and  
political relevance, locally and nationally. 
Friend of labor
 Whether it was in her nature, her upbringing, or simply the bent 
of this self-proclaimed “passionate moderate,” Hillman did not buy the 
narrative that Republicans were the party of people who cared only 
about powerful industrialists and lower taxes while Democrats were 
the party of the working people beholden to labor unions. She believed 
that working people and their unions in Pittsburgh would vote Repub-
lican given the right candidate. 
 As it turned out, she was correct. For one thing, organized labor 
had never wanted to be taken for granted. Jack Shea, the president  
of the Allegheny County Labor Council, said, “It’s not about Ds and Rs 
with us. We’re not a party. It’s about how you are on the issues. Just 
because you’ve got a D behind your name doesn’t mean that we’re  
going to be for you.” 
 Labor leaders also respected businesspeople who treated their 
employees fairly, and Henry Hillman, the president of the Hillman 
Company, was one of those who did. When union leaders looked at 
the Hillman Company’s real estate projects, for example, they saw jobs 
that were “100 percent union, and they pay all their bills,” said Jim 
Klingensmith, executive vice president of the Allegheny County Labor 
Council. The Hillmans' good friend, H. John "Jack" Heinz II, president 
of the H.J. Heinz Company, also was highly regarded. The United Food 
and Commercial Workers International Union employees at the Heinz 
Company “loved the Heinzes,” Klingensmith said, and that included 
Jack’s son, John, who worked at the company. Klingensmith said the 
joke was that Jack Heinz urged his son to go into politics because the 
younger Heinz “was settling too many grievances in the cafeteria before 
they got up to human resources.” 
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 With the help of labor, Elsie Hillman helped John Heinz to launch 
his political career. She and her husband were in Japan in the spring 
of 1971 when they learned that Republican U.S. Representative Robert 
Corbett had died. The Republican Committee of Allegheny County 
would have just weeks to nominate its candidate to run in a special 
election	to	fill	Corbett’s	term.	Pott	wanted	that	nomination,	but	John	
Heinz had sent Hillman a telegram asking for her support, knowing 
that	her	influence	with	committee	members	was	powerful.	She	sent	
Heinz back a telegram pledging her support and that same day sent 
350 telegrams to Republican committee members, urging them to do 
the same. 
 Heinz secured the Republican Party’s support in Allegheny County, 
earning the chance to run against the Democrats’ choice, John E. 
Connelly,	the	owner	of	a	fleet	of	riverboats.	Republican	Party	regulars	
thought that seeking the support of organized labor would be a waste 
of time, but Hillman, who chaired Labor for Heinz, and Jim McGregor, 
Heinz’s campaign chair, believed that individual labor unions would 
support Heinz if they had the chance to meet him. 
	 Hillman’s	first	step	was	to	ask	the	Allegheny	County	labor	council	
not to endorse either candidate. A request like that from a Republican 
Party	official	would	have	been	unthinkable	a	few	years	earlier,	but	the	
Heinz name and the relationships that Hillman had forged during  
earlier campaigns meant that the labor council would at least consider 
her request. (Hillman knew and had worked with Jack Armand, the 
leader	of	the	cab	drivers’	union	in	Pittsburgh,	having	first	met	him	
through her childhood friend, boxing great Billy Conn.)
 The labor council agreed to withhold its endorsement, giving  
Hillman and Heinz’s campaign staffers the leeway to court each of the 
unions separately. Hillman brought Heinz to early morning meetings 
with labor members at plant gates, introduced him to the carpenters’ 
union	and	the	steamfitters’	union,	and	got	him	written	endorsements	
from	one	local	after	another.	Hillman	also	opened	an	office	in	the	 
Frick Building in downtown Pittsburgh for the exclusive use of union 
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volunteers so that they could use its free telephones for the new tech-
nology of “phone banking.” Russ Martz, who worked for Heinz’s campaign, 
said that Hillman would say to each union, “We would like John Heinz’s 
picture on the front page of every publication you send to your member-
ship, please. And we want these phone banks manned from 3 in the 
afternoon to 9 at night, every night, calling your members. I want you 
to take responsibility to make sure those phone lines are busy and that 
they’re calling members to remind them that the union is supporting 
John Heinz in this election. Okay?”
 Early in the Heinz congressional campaign, Hillman approached 
Marylou Stefanko, the local head of the state’s largest teachers’ union, 
the Pennsylvania State Education Association (PSEA), asking if she 
would meet with a moderate Republican. After thinking about it for  
a week, Stefanko agreed to meet Heinz and was impressed enough to  
organize her union to work for him, getting more than 500 volunteers  
to use the union phone bank. Stefanko also issued a challenge to a 
friend of Connelly, betting that he could not get his candidate to debate 
Heinz (something Connelly had avoided). He took the bait, and the  
debate before 200 PSEA members helped to turn the tide for Heinz. 
“There was no question after that debate that the Western Region was 
going to make the recommendation to the state PACE [Political Action  
Committee for Education] that we wanted to endorse Heinz,” said  
Stefanko. At a rally held in Pittsburgh near the end of the campaign, 
more than 2,000 teachers, Teamsters, members of the building trades, 
and mine workers turned out for Heinz.41
 Heinz won that election and every other race he ever entered.  
“Elsie was tremendously helpful in getting the AFL-CIO [American  
Federation of Labor -Congress of Industrial Organizations] endorse-
ment in a tough year, and she was just as helpful with getting the  
endorsement from [then United Mine Workers of America President  
Richard] Trumka and the United Mine Workers,” said Kevin Talley, 
who managed Heinz’s later campaigns for the U.S. Senate. In Heinz’s 
last	campaign,	he	won	two-thirds	of	the	state’s	vote;	few	officials	on	 
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the national scene were as popular in their home states. The unlikely 
heart of his base was organized labor. 
 Pittsburgh’s labor leaders introduced Hillman to their peers in  
the eastern part of the state, said the Labor Council’s Klingensmith.  
“The ironworkers who were here got her an introduction with those 
guys in the east, and she was just so gracious. How do you not like her?  
And they developed a relationship and they trusted her, just like we 
trusted her here.” But Hillman did not always wait to be introduced. 
When she was working for Heinz’s run for U.S. Senate in 1976, she 
happened to be in a cab heading from the airport into Philadelphia  
and had an extra half hour, so she asked the cab driver to take her  
to see John P. Morris, the head of the Teamsters in Philadelphia.  
Hillman had been working with the Teamsters in Pittsburgh through 
Jack Armand, so she felt that asking for Morris’ support was worth  
a shot. As she remembered it, she walked in and said to the 10 skepti-
cal men sitting there, “ ‘Hello, I’m Elsie Hillman from Pittsburgh and  
I would love to see Mr. Morris. Is he here?’ I didn’t know him from a 
cake of soap but I talked to him about the campaign, and he seemed  
to like what I was saying.” Hillman remembered that Morris and  
the Teamsters did decide to endorse Heinz in his campaign for U.S. 
Senate. Years later, Morris would present Hillman with Philadelphia 
Local 502’s Civic Award.
 Hillman’s support among union members is strong to this day, and 
she has worked with labor leaders on more than political campaigns. 
She was their ally in advocating for a new airport in Pittsburgh along 
with other building projects that they agreed were good for Pittsburgh 
and good for jobs. They still approach her to work behind the scenes to 
resolve misunderstandings, as they did in averting a strike by janitors. 
Shea said that when janitorial workers threatened to stop work in the 
City of Pittsburgh, a union leader called Hillman to explain that some-
thing was going awry in their communications with business leaders. 
“Somebody wasn’t getting the message to the right people. Elsie Hillman 
called the people that needed to be called.” The issue was resolved. 
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 Why is it that labor members felt a connection to Hillman? Shea 
thought it was because “she had time for regular people. She had time 
for	people	who	need	other	people.”	Klingensmith	said,	“She	figures	 
labor’s a big part of the community and a big part of the overall struc-
ture of the community. She’s always respected whichever way we’ve 
gone. She’s never tried to pressure anybody.” 
 The fact was that Hillman liked the labor leaders she met and they 
liked her, something that at least one “upper-crust Pittsburgher” could 
not fathom. “I never understand why she got involved in politics,” said 
this person in a 1969 Forbes article. Forbes did not identify this person. 
“Having to bother with the kind of people she gets involved with—
cheap politicians, ward heelers, people like that. Even inviting them 
into her home.”42
  LeRoy Zimmerman, former attorney general of Pennsylvania, 
seemed to understand Hillman’s ability to connect with all sorts of 
people: “Life is about relationships. If there’s anyone I know in my 
experience in politics and government who understood the value, the 
need, and the loyalty of relationships, it is Elsie Hillman.”
 As Hillman rose in the party, George H.W. Bush and other leaders 
would	benefit	from	those	relationships	and	her	growing	skills	as	a	
social actor.
State and national party leader
 After Raymond Shafer was elected Pennsylvania’s governor in 1966, 
more than 200 Allegheny County Republicans headed to Harrisburg 
for his January 1967 inauguration. Hillman, who organized the trip, 
wanted to give the Allegheny County contingent a chance to meet other 
volunteers in the state, so she and David Maxwell of Philadelphia 
handwrote invitations on construction paper that read: “The Allegheny 
Armpit. Open 24 Hours. Starting Now.” When people arrived at the door 
to the Allegheny Armpit—an impromptu gathering in a Harrisburg hotel 
room—they	saw	Hillman	dressed	as	a	Bond	Girl,	with	fishnet	stockings,	
go-go boots, shimmering gold raincoat—and her signature headband. 
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 Hillman had begun to gain attention at the state level as someone 
who could make politics fun even as she could organize, lead, and win 
campaigns. She looked for chances to have food and drink, making her 
homemade stuffed cabbage or “beans and weenies,” inviting other women 
volunteers to eat popcorn in her hotel room during state meetings, or 
talking usually taciturn Republican men into being part of a panto-
mimed circus act. She knew that injecting levity could soften some of  
the divisions of geography or points of view and be a salve when times 
were tense.
 At the request of her peers in other counties, Hillman began to 
spend time helping them to raise money, which allowed her to extend 
the network of friendships she had begun to build during trips to the 
Republican National Conventions. While some asked her to come to 
their counties, she also sought out county chairs, particularly those she 
admired and from whom she wanted to learn, including county chairs 
Anne Anstine of Juniata County and Andy Gleason of Cambria County, 
who became her friends. Gleason said of Hillman, “I never knew anybody 
in all my years in politics and business that had the ‘touch’ that Elsie 
had. She could take somebody off the streets and talk to them the  
same as she could someone who was her good friend.” 
	 One	of	the	sources	of	her	growing	influence	in	the	party	was	her	
family’s ability to make sizable contributions. Elsie and Henry Hillman 
each gave $25,000 to the campaigns of several candidates—substantial 
contributions, but less than others gave in a state that has no upper limit 
on campaign contributions. The Hillmans could have given more, but, 
according to John Denny, who worked with Elsie Hillman on several 
elections, they never wanted to short-circuit the process that candidates 
must go through to build a broad base of support with a mix of donors. 
 More important than her personal contributions to candidates was 
Hillman’s willingness to help other county chairs and the Republican 
State Committee (now known as the Pennsylvania State Party) to 
bring	in	state-	and	national-level	figures	to	raise	money.	She	began	by	
asking Scott, Scranton, and Shafer to help her get notables to speak 
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at fundraising events. She also would just pick up the telephone and 
call people, whether she knew them or not. “When we were working on 
the Eisenhower campaign,” Hillman recalled, “I called up the attorney 
general in New York [Louis Lefkowitz, a close ally of Rockefeller’s] and 
got him on the phone from our little headquarters. ... I didn’t know him 
at all. I just thought, ‘Why can’t you call up the attorney general of New 
York	and	find	out	what	you	want	to	find	out?’	It	just	didn’t	occur	to	me	
that you couldn’t do that.” Years later, after she became one of Pennsyl-
vania’s three members on the RNC, she could more easily ask national 
leaders like Senators Bob Dole, Howard Baker, and John Danforth to 
travel to Pennsylvania to help candidates. 
 Over time, Hillman would build a network of friends who some 
might call “foot soldiers”—people she could mobilize to support the  
candidates or issues she cared about. Those loyalists were not only  
in the western part of the state; former Lieutenant Governor William 
Scranton III said that, in the east, the closer Hillman got to the  
Susquehanna River, the more powerful she was.
	 Because	of	her	growing	influence,	the	party’s	1974	candidate	for	
governor, Drew Lewis, asked Hillman to run for lieutenant governor. 
Reported at the time as whispers and possibilities, a letter Hillman 
wrote to Lewis in February 1974 indicates that he had asked her  
directly. “Thank you, Drew,” Hillman wrote. “In my golden years  
(too fast approaching!) I will probably tell my great-grandchildren  
that I was asked to run for Lt. Governor in Pennsylvania.”43
 As she increasingly stumped statewide for candidates and served  
on	the	state	party’s	leadership	and	finance	committees,	Hillman	 
encountered the “kings” of the Republican Party, the chairs of Philadel-
phia, Montgomery, Chester, Bucks, Delaware, and Lancaster counties. 
Theirs were the pivotal counties in elections for statewide and even 
presidential candidates, and they were unabashed in expecting that 
Republicans who worked hard to elect the governor or treasurer could 
expect to have the chance at a state job or contract or to serve on a  
commission. That was the arrangement in Pennsylvania, one of the 
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last states to eliminate unbridled patronage. The party that held  
the	governor’s	office	controlled	thousands	of	state	jobs	and	millions	 
of dollars in state contracts. The party faithful at the state and county 
level would be rewarded, and, in the counties, this meant contracts and 
access	to	field-level	jobs,	such	as	highway	and	state	hospital	jobs.	The	
county chairs controlled this local patronage and could deploy thousands 
of volunteers during campaigns and raise hundreds of thousands of 
dollars,	so	candidates	for	statewide	office	relied	on	them	for	their	war	
chests and votes. 
	 Hillman	did	not	pretend	to	wield	the	influence	these	men	had,	as	
Allegheny County constituted no more than 11 percent of the common-
wealth’s registered Republican vote in the 1970s. But she took her seat 
at the table without apparent hesitation. As LeRoy Zimmerman, the 
state’s	first	elected	attorney	general,	put	it,	“She	had	the	ability	to	sit	
in the room with Billy Meehan [of Philadelphia] and Andy Gleason and 
George Bloom [the state chair] and talk the talk. She understood how 
deals were made, election tickets were put together—that included  
considerations of geography and gender. ... She’d come into the leader-
ship meetings and start talking about what she felt, what she believed,  
and why, and before you know it, we left with consensus.”  
 “When Elsie came down here to the southeast,” said Delaware 
County Chair Tom Judge, “she might have thought, ‘Hey, these are 
macho	men.	They’re	not	going	to	accept	me.’	But	we	finally	did.”	
Elected to the RNC in turbulent times
 In 1975, when the state committee elected Hillman to be one of 
Pennsylvania’s three members on the Republican National Committee 
(RNC), it was an indication of the support she had earned among her 
peers. But she was joining the national committee during the most  
turbulent year in its history. Nixon had resigned in 1974, damaging  
Republicans in elections at every level of government and tainting the 
reputation of the RNC. “A mere 18 percent of the American people dared 
admit they were Republicans,” wrote historian Catherine Rymph.44
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 After Gerald Ford succeeded Nixon as president (and Nelson  
Rockefeller became Ford’s vice president), he appointed Iowa’s Mary 
Louise Smith as RNC chair, in part as a way to reach out to women  
but also because Smith was a good grassroots organizer and a trusted  
moderate in the party. One reporter who had followed Smith’s career 
wrote that she spent a lot of time “worrying about ways to attract Blacks 
and other minorities,” according to Rymph. Smith also was an active 
supporter of the Equal Rights Amendment, and in this she was a  
reflection	of	the	average	Republican	woman	of	the	time—56	percent	 
of Republican women were in favor of the ERA.45  
 Smith had to work quickly to organize the Republican convention 
that would take place in Kansas City, Mo., in August 1976. This one  
was bound to be contentious, as Ronald Reagan was challenging Ford  
for the nomination. In the years since Reagan’s nominating speech at 
the 1964 convention, Reagan had become the favored leader of a new 
coalition of conservatives. This group included people who had been 
attracted to Goldwater’s conservative philosophy along with the “new 
right”—people who melded their conservative politics with their religious 
views and considered themselves purists. Goldwater repudiated the  
connection between his conservative movement and this new coalition. 
In	1981,	he	said,	“I’ve	spent	quite	a	number	of	years	carrying	the	flag	
of the ‘Old Conservatism.’ And I can say with conviction that the religious 
issues of these groups have little or nothing to do with conservative or 
liberal politics. The uncompromising position of these groups is a divisive 
element that could tear apart the very spirit of our representative system,  
if	they	gain	sufficient	strength.”46
 Even in 1976, the new right had impressive strength. Ford felt 
their pressure and, to gain their support, agreed to a change in his 
choice of running mate. Rockefeller was out and the more conservative 
Dole was in as his chosen candidate for vice president.
 When the convention began, Reagan was 103 delegates short of the  
total he needed for the nomination and Ford needed 22 more, so both set 
out to woo uncommitted delegates. In a bold attempt to win over moderates, 
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structure of the rePublican Party
 Republican Party members are linked through national, state, and local  
committees that recruit and support candidates and advocate for the party platform.
 The Republican National Committee (RNC) is based in Washington, D.C.  
and has 168 members—three per state or territory (a national committeeman,  
a national committeewoman, and a state chair). The highest-ranking Republican  
at the state level (e.g., the governor) nominates the national committee members,  
and the state committee members vote to approve them. The RNC meets twice 
each year. 
 The Republican state committees (called State Central Committees or  
State Executive Committees) are composed of members approved or elected  
by Republican voters in their states’ counties or congressional districts.  
In Pennsylvania, state committee members are elected every two years during  
the Republican primary, and the number of committee members per county  
is based on that county’s share of the registered Republicans in the state.  
Each county is assured of receiving at least two members. 
 At the county level, two local committee members (one male and one female) 
are elected from each voting precinct to their Republican county committee. 
These county committee members also serve on their local municipality’s  
party committee.
 At Republican national conventions, Pennsylvania’s 75 delegates include  
its three national committee members, 62 directly elected delegates, and 10 others 
appointed by the state committee.
Reagan announced that U.S. Senator Richard Schweiker of Pennsylvania 
would be his running mate. This placed the Pennsylvania delegation in  
a	difficult	position;	Schweiker	was	the	state’s	top-ranking	Republican	 
and was well liked, but the state’s electorate had voted for Ford by an 
overwhelming 92 percent to Reagan’s 1 percent in the spring primary.
	 Hillman,	national	committeewoman	for	the	state	and	floor	leader	for	
Pennsylvania Republicans, was responsible for holding together the state’s 
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delegation for Ford. (Lewis, national committeeman for Pennsylvania, 
showed particular conviction in the interest of party unity, as he and 
Schweiker had been friends since childhood.) William Scranton III,  
who was on the staff of the state committee at the time, remembered,  
“It was a battle for the soul and the votes of the Pennsylvania Repub-
lican delegation. Elsie was very much the strategist. She had meetings 
all the time: ‘How are we going to keep this person?’ On the phone with 
the Ford people and our delegates. Pigeonholing delegates at breakfast, 
at lunch. It was constant maintenance to make sure that they were 
there.” It took time, meetings, and organization, but it also was true 
that Hillman could transfer to Ford some of the goodwill she had been 
building in the state. Scranton continued, “A lot of the delegates were 
very committed, personally, to Elsie.” 
 While delegations like Pennsylvania’s remained loyal to Ford, who 
ultimately won the nomination, conservatives for Reagan were able 
to	outflank	moderates	by	clever	maneuvering	before	the	convention,	
when they gained a majority on several of the subcommittees that were 
reviewing the party platform. One of these subcommittees voted to  
recommend removing language in the party platform that supported 
the ERA. Although the subcommittee’s recommendation was not  
accepted by the crucial platform committee, the vote was close. Social 
conservatives did win a major victory on another plank, however. At 
this	first	convention	since	Roe v. Wade, they were able to orchestrate 
a change in the language on abortion. The plank was changed to read: 
“The Republican Party favors a continuance of the public dialogue  
on abortion and supports the efforts of those who seek enactment  
of a constitutional amendment to restore protection of the right to life 
for unborn children.”47	This	marked	the	first	time	in	its	history	that	 
the Republican Party had supported a constitutional amendment to 
ban abortion. 
 Hillman and other national committee members worked after  
the	convention	to	reaffirm	the	party’s	commitment	to	women’s	rights.	
In 1979, she was able to work within the RNC’s executive committee to 
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develop and pass a “unity resolution” modeled on the one that she had 
advocated for, successfully, within the state committee in Pennsylvania. 
The resolution would have little impact, however, for it was passed 
within the largely moderate RNC, while social conservatives were 
building grassroots support across the country.
 It was at the 1980 convention in Detroit (where Reagan won  
the	presidential	nomination)	that,	for	the	first	time	since	1940,	the	
approved party platform did not explicitly endorse the Equal Rights 
Amendment. Instead, it substituted this wording: “We acknowledge 
the	legitimate	efforts	of	those	who	support	or	oppose	ratification	of	
the Equal Rights Amendment.”48 The Ripon Forum, a magazine on 
moderate	Republican	thinking,	included	this	comment:	“Although	first	
to endorse the principle of an Equal Rights Amendment at a national 
convention,	the	Party	has	now	become	the	first	to	sanction	its	abandon-
ment.”49 The most that supporters of the ERA could hope to do was 
keep out a plank that actually opposed the amendment. 
 This convention was bittersweet for Hillman, who was thrilled by 
the nomination of moderate and friend George H.W. Bush for vice pres-
ident but alarmed by evidence of the ascendance of social conservatives 
in the party. A supporter of abortion rights, Hillman was within the 
strong majority of Republicans; 63 percent of the delegates who attended 
the convention said that they supported the Roe v. Wade decision,  
according to Bill Brock, who had replaced Smith as RNC chair. The 
same was true on the ERA, with two supporters for every one opponent. 
 In Hillman’s mind, a principle was at stake. “If we allowed one issue 
to dictate our politics,” she said 10 years later, “our system as we know 
it would go down the chute.”50 
 Brock was not at all happy with the way that the 1980 party  
platform drew attention to divisions within the party. “We had very, 
very carefully worked to break several Republican stereotypes— 
by holding the convention in Detroit, for one thing. ... I was obviously  
distressed to see the primary debate focused on what was described as 
the social issues. I felt that we were risking the under-40 target group 
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that	we	had	identified	as	our	primary	goal.	...	I	discussed	at	length	with	
the Reagan people the possibility of a quieter approach to the platform. 
We simply lost control of the situation.”51 After the platform committee 
voted to abandon the ERA and added a clause favoring congressional 
restrictions on abortion, the RNC’s cochair, Mary Dent Crisp, walked 
out of the convention and went to work for third-party candidate  
John Anderson.
 The dimensions of the new social conservative network that had 
formed were not well understood at the time. One party leader later 
said, “I don’t know of a legislator that was ever afraid of them. They 
really weren’t organized.” Hillman, however, was one person who had 
learned that the religious right was actually quite organized. A union 
friend of hers had shared some research on the religious right, including 
a map and charts that showed the overlap among the boards of several 
evangelical Christian organizations, political action committees, and 
television and radio stations. “Somebody was on the board of one group 
roots of the religious right 
 According to Paul Weyrich, who cofounded the Heritage Foundation, other 
conservative organizations, and political action committees, it was not the U.S. 
Supreme Court decision in Roe v. Wade that unified conservative Christians  
as a political force. “What galvanized the Christian community was not abortion, 
school prayer, or the ERA. I am living witness because I was trying to get those 
people interested in those issues and I utterly failed. What changed their mind 
was Jimmy Carter’s intervention against the Christian schools, trying to deny 
them tax-exempt status on the basis of so-called de facto segregation. ...  
Suddenly it dawned on them that they were not going to be left alone to teach 
their children as they pleased. It was at that moment that conservatives made  
the linkage between their opposition to government interference and the interests 
of the evangelical movement. That is what brought those people into the political 
process.” (From With God on Our Side: The Rise of the Religious Right in America, 
by William Martin, p. 173). 
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here, on the board of this one over there, and they were all much more 
combined than anybody thought they were,” said Hillman.
 Hillman went to talk to party leaders across the state and in  
Washington, D.C. Her message was consistent: The religious right is a 
strong and organized force that uses the “single-issue trap” of abortion 
to ensnare candidates who disagree with its ideology. To one group of 
Republican leaders she said, “There was a day not too long ago when 
we	were	all	terrified	of	the	left	wing.	After	all,	it	was	the	left	wing	that	
marched	on	Washington	and	burned	flags	and	perhaps	toppled	Lyndon	
Johnson’s presidency. But it was also the left wing in the peace and civil 
rights movement that we were all free to join. For the most part, they 
wanted everyone on board and kept the doors open. ... But where,  
I wonder, does the right wing keep its door?”52 Former U.S. Senator  
Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania said that it was Hillman who was the  
first	to	alert	the	state’s	Republican	delegation	in	Congress	to	the	growing	
power of the New Right. Hillman’s recollection of that meeting with  
the delegation was that they were unconvinced. “They thought I’d lost  
my mind,” she said.
	 Soon,	however,	the	new	right’s	organizational	skill	and	influence	
among voters was impossible to ignore. Jim Leach, chair of the Ripon 
Society, wrote that the RNC should conduct a thorough review of  
“the role of the New Right in American public life today and [an] assess-
ment of the appropriateness of the party identifying in any way with  
New Right causes and New Right tactics.”53
 By the time Bush ran for president in 1988, he had to overcome a 
challenge from candidates supported by the religious right, including  
Pat Robertson. While Bush defeated them in the primary and was  
nominated	at	the	convention,	the	social	conservatives	filled	many	of	the	
convention’s	committees	and	exerted	influence	because	their	supporters 
had run successfully to be delegates to the convention. Their show  
of strength in 1988 was eclipsed four years later when the Houston  
convention, which should have been the showcase of the party’s resolve 
and unity in reelecting Bush, instead displayed the party’s factions  
to the country.
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 That 1992 convention was when former Republican candidate  
Pat Buchanan gave a nationally televised address to the delegates  
that excited some and alarmed others with his mean-spirited remarks 
(“Hillary [Clinton] has compared marriage and the family, as institutions, 
to slavery and life on an Indian reservation. Well, speak for yourself, 
Hillary.”) and his messianic rhetoric (“There is a religious war going on  
in this country. It is a cultural war, as critical to the kind of nation we 
shall be as the Cold War itself. For this war is for the soul of America. 
And in that struggle for the soul of America, Clinton and Clinton are 
on the other side, and George Bush is on our side.”) This also was the 
convention in which the platform committee voted to change the words 
“mindful of our country’s rich religious pluralism” to “mindful of our 
country’s Judeo-Christian heritage.” And, on abortion, it was quickly 
clear that Hillman and the others who wanted to remove abortion from 
the platform were outnumbered. 
 Hillman and her RNC allies encountered opposition at many turns. 
For example, the 1992 convention organizers had changed the names 
of some subcommittees, which may have been done to confuse the press 
and members of the public who wanted to witness the deliberations.  
The subcommittee on “individual rights, good homes, and safe streets” 
was the place for discussion of the Los Angeles riots along with abortion. 
In the early days of the convention, the press reported that convention 
leaders refused to allow Barbara Mosbacher, the sister of Bush’s campaign 
chair, to rent a room for a press conference because it was not an  
official	party	meeting,	while	they	had	permitted	the	Christian	Coalition	
of America to hold press conferences in the main hotel. Tanya Melich,  
an alternate delegate at the convention, wrote, “An outsider would have 
thought, from the way we were treated, that we were a battalion of  
Clinton Democrats from Arkansas, come to storm the Platform Committee, 
rather	than	a	hundred-or-so	pro-choice	Republicans.	Police	officers	and	
security seemed to outnumber Republicans.”54
 When the issue of abortion rights was brought to the platform com-
mittee, Vivian Petura from New Mexico said, “This is not a political issue. 
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Ladies and gentlemen, please take it out of the platform.”55 A few other 
committee members joined her, asking the platform committee to include 
“big tent” language instead, but they failed. The only hope of bringing 
their	recommendation	to	the	floor	of	the	convention	was	a	minority	 
report, which required the agreement of six delegations. Hillman,  
national committeeman Herb Barness, and Specter agreed to make 
Pennsylvania’s delegation one of the six. But there was not enough 
support to sway the other delegations, so the statement on abortion 
remained in the platform. 
 When Hillman returned to Pennsylvania from the 1992 convention, 
she mobilized her political network and began to be more strategic  
in her own contributions to campaigns to help counter the growing 
conservative movement in her own state. She persuaded the state 
committee to adopt a statement of principles that excluded any mention 
of abortion (something she later suggested as a model for the 1996 
convention). She continued to speak publicly. “I see an intolerance that 
comes from the very right wing of the party, and I think that’s very 
dangerous. It’s not conducive to having people come together to solve 
problems,” she told reporters.56 She started a political action committee 
called the Republican Future Fund to support the campaigns of mod-
erate candidates. (Across the Republican Future Fund’s most active 
years, it contributed more than $200,000 to campaigns and the party, 
drawing its money from Hillman, corporate leaders, and other Repub-
licans.) And when candidates wrote to Hillman for contributions, she 
began to turn them down if she thought that they had kowtowed to the 
religious right. This was not always simple. When Pennsylvania State 
Senator Mike Fisher, who was about to mount a campaign for attorney 
general, asked Hillman to contribute, she wrote back late in 1995: 
  I admit to being on the horns of a dilemma here as you are  
  somebody who has been a friend for a long time and we have   
  worked together for many years. ... My problem is that I am  
  really tired of being shoved around by “pro-lifers.”... With our  
  state legislature, 140 strong out of 203 members in the pro-life  
  caucus, holding the governor hostage on his education bill,  
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	 	 I	am	really	not	anxious	to	turn	the	attorney	general’s	office	 
  open again to use its power to further this trend!
  However, I am sending a contribution. ... If asked, I will send  
  a contribution also to Mike [Montgomery County District   
  Attorney Michael Marino, a potential candidate in the primary  
  who was pro-choice] ... and will support the person who wins  
  the party endorsement at the next meeting. ... I do not believe   
  that we are dealing with understandable religious conviction,  
  but instead, with zealots.57
 State committee members started to hear grumbling from social 
conservatives in the state about Hillman’s activities. Some wrote to say 
that she should not be reelected as national committeewoman because 
of a large-scale mailing she had helped to send out that unveiled the 
Christian Coalition’s support for candidates. Some conservatives called  
on the state committee to investigate her.58
 John Denny, who worked with Hillman on state and national  
campaigns, remembered that, in early 1996, there was a movement  
afoot to denounce Hillman just after the annual Lincoln Day dinner  
in Harrisburg, which happened to be close to the weekend when the 
Pittsburgh Steelers were playing the Dallas Cowboys in Super Bowl 
XXX. Denny said that she mailed every state committee member a  
Steelers’ Terrible Towel ahead of the day and then “turned the entire  
Lincoln Day dinner into a fun Steeler party with little Steeler footballs 
and Steeler paraphernalia. She stood up and defused the tension by  
saying, ‘We can be against each other on this or that, but when it  
comes to the Super Bowl, we’re all Steeler fans.’ ”
 Although Hillman was getting close to announcing her retirement 
from the RNC, she wanted to serve on the platform committee for the 
1996	convention	in	San	Diego—her	first	and	only	time	on	the	platform	
committee. “I just knew what the issue was going to be,” she said.  
For months prior to the convention, she worked to build support for 
removing the abortion language from the platform, and when nominee 
apparent Dole said in June that he would support a “declaration of  
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tolerance” in the platform, she urged delegates to write to him and  
the RNC to urge them to include this language. She also met with  
RNC Chair Haley Barbour and several dozen Republican members  
of Congress to discuss removing abortion from the platform and  
formally surveyed the Republican leaders in the country so that she 
could announce to the platform committee the leadership’s support  
for removing the abortion plank.59
 The San Diego convention would not generate the heat of the  
1992 convention, in part because so many moderates had given up. 
The religious right was able to build upon its earlier successes, adding 
language on abortion to several planks where it had never been before. 
While the declaration of tolerance was debated, it did not pass.
	 Hillman	officially	retired	from	party	leadership	in	1996.	At	her	 
suggestion, the state committee elected her good friend, Anne Anstine, 
to take her place as national committeewoman. Hillman now had the 
time she had wanted to spend with her grandchildren and volunteer  
for ventures that affected the city she cared so much about—from the 
Regional Renaissance Initiative, which has preserved and supported  
assets like the area’s libraries and museums, and the Home Rule Cam-
paign, which changed the structure of Allegheny County’s government, 
to the Pittsburgh Financial Leadership Committee, which developed 
strategies	for	returning	the	City	of	Pittsburgh	to	firmer	financial	footing.
 She did not completely close the chapter on politics, however. When 
Hillman retired from party leadership, she wrote a letter to the state 
committee that said, “I will miss all of the fun I have had and all the 
friends I have so enjoyed because the whole experience has been such  
a big part of my life. But I can run alongside you all, shouting and waving 
banners no matter where I am on the road! And I will!”60 During her 
retirement, she did more than wave banners—she cochaired six more 
campaigns, making sure that she could help Specter, Governor Tom 
Ridge, and State Treasurer Barbara Hafer at least one more time. 
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
C H A P T E R  T H R E E
T h e  S k i l l e d  S o c i a l  A c t o r
 In 1997, sociologist Neil Fligstein published his paper, “Social Skill 
and the Theory of Fields,” exciting scholars in disciplines ranging from 
sociology and political science to game theory. Fligstein had articulated  
a	framework	for	understanding	how	people	spark	change	in	fields 
ranging from government and corporations to the civil rights movement. 
In doing so, he helped to focus political inquiry on the artistry of key 
actors within institutions—and to move away from a “distanced,  
abstract, and only marginally applicable would-be science,” according 
to Philip Agre, formerly of the University of California, Los Angeles, 
information studies department.61
 Fligstein argued that organizations are built or changed by “skilled 
social actors”—inspired entrepreneurs who know how to seize oppor-
tunities and lead others in a direction that they believe is good for the 
institution. Their strength lies in being able to “empathetically relate 
to the situations of other people and in doing so ... provide those people 
with	reasons	to	cooperate,”	wrote	Fligstein.	“Their	own	sense	of	efficacy	
comes, not from some narrow conception of self-interest, but from the 
act of inducing cooperation and helping others attain ends.”62
 How these skilled social actors induce cooperation comes down to a 
core set of strategies, whether they are working within a political party 
or a social movement. Skilled social actors: 
	 •	 persuade	people	that	they	share	some	overriding	values	 
  and frame the stories that unite them. 
	 •	 broker	behind	the	scenes	to	convince	one	group	after	another		 	
	 	 that	a	particular	agenda	will	benefit	them.	This	might	include		  
  convincing people that what they can get is really what they   
  wanted all along.
	 •	 seize	opportunities	that	arise	and	are	resourceful,	using	 
	 	 whatever	is	on	hand	to	benefit	the	organization.
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	 •	 form	alliances	with	disparate	groups,	including	people	 
  with few other choices or who are outside the institution.  
  They can become the node of the network they build,  
  “the source of information and coalition-building.”
	 •	 try	to	do	more	than	it	is	possible	to	achieve.	Skilled	social	 
  actors know that the excitement of action can create  
  an environment in which people feel that they are part  
  of a movement and that people forget losses in the wake  
  of even a few victories.
 Many of the people who worked closely with Elsie Hillman over the 
years have indicated that she possessed all of these qualities. Martin 
Hamberger said, “She leads people to want to be part of that group,  
organization, or movement because she helps them realize their goal 
and to make it work on the ground.” Kevin Talley said that watching 
Hillman led him to realize that “it’s important to be able to work 
together on different issues and walk away, if not agreeing, at least 
not mad at each other.” Steve Dunkle, who worked for the Republican 
State Committee, said, “She never wanted to be center stage. It was 
never about Elsie. She just worked behind the curtain.” And LeRoy 
Zimmerman	said,	“You	know,	she	wasn’t	a	fist	pounder	or	a	demander.	
She had a quiet, persuasive, but powerful manner in which to move 
people to consensus.”
 The cases that follow provide evidence of Hillman’s political entre-
preneurship, beyond what these and other individuals have said about 
her.	The	first	case	about	George	H.W.	Bush’s	run	for	president	in	1980	
shows Hillman’s resourcefulness and persuasive skills, which were as 
important in injecting energy (and some hot air) into a campaign as in 
getting her candidate before Pennsylvania’s labor leaders. In the case 
of Doris Carson Williams’ run for Pittsburgh City Council, Hillman  
was able to call upon the alliances she had built with people across  
the city of Pittsburgh and serve as the “source of coalition building.”  
In the study of her role in Dick Thornburgh’s rise in politics and his  
run for governor, Hillman can be seen as a broker behind the scenes,  
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reaching out to key leaders (including Jesse Jackson) on behalf of a  
moderate she believed would be good for the state and the country.  
The Barbara Hafer study shows Hillman’s persuasive skill—initially  
in convincing Hafer that she should change political parties and later, 
when she needed to exhort Hafer and party leaders to press on during  
an	ill-fated	campaign.	And	finally,	Hillman’s	resourcefulness	and	 
ability to create a sense of excitement and action became important  
at key points in Tom Ridge’s campaign for governor.
 In each of the cases, Hillman seized opportunities, engaged in  
a bit of bricolage, and induced cooperation—all for the sake of the  
Republican Party.
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Hillman joined U.S. Senator Jacob Javits of New York and H.J. Heinz II in supporting 
the reelection campaign of her mentor, U.S. Senator Hugh Scott.
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Hillman and Wendell Freeland organized a 1962 rally for Pennsylvania gubernatorial candidate  
William	Scranton	that	proved	that	the	region	did,	indeed,	have	more	Republicans	than	could	fit	 
in a telephone booth. 
IM
A
G
E 
C
O
U
R
TE
Sy
 t
h
e
 N
ew
 P
it
ts
b
u
r
g
h
 C
o
u
r
ie
r
. 
U
SE
D
 W
IT
H
 P
ER
M
IS
SI
O
N
.
53
FR
O
M
 H
Il
lM
A
N
’S
 P
ER
SO
N
A
l 
A
R
C
H
IV
ES
Hillman, at center, hosting an impromptu party at a hotel room dubbed “The Allegheny Armpit,”  
a gathering that brought together party members from around Pennsylvania at the Harrisburg  
inauguration of Governor Raymond Shafer in 1967. 
 
At top is Hillman’s handwritten invitation to the event. 
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Hillman’s election to the post of chair of the Allegheny County Republican Party in 1967 
inspired extensive media coverage, including this political cartoon, which ran in the  
Pittsburgh Post-Gazette. 
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Henry Hillman congratulates his wife on her 1967 election as Allegheny County Republican Committee 
Chair.	Elsie	Hillman	was	the	first	woman	elected	to	that	post	in	a	major	urban	area.
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As volunteer chair of the Allegheny County Republican Party, Hillman, along with Republican 
staff member Jessie Hewlett, accepts petitions for the upcoming election.
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Hillman	and	then	Vice	President	George	H.W.	Bush	in	his	office	during	the	Ronald	Reagan	administration
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Hillman works the phones in George H.W. Bush’s Pittsburgh campaign headquarters along with national 
campaign director Jim Wray during Pennsylvania’s 1988 primary. 
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Barbara Hafer (center), Hillman, and State Senator James Greenwood at the PA Republicans for Choice 
rally in Harrisburg, 1992
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Hillman bid good friend Barbara Bush farewell after a White House reception for Pennsylvania supporters  
in 1990.
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Left to right, U.S. Representative Bill Clinger, Delaware County GOP Chair Tom Judge, Anne Anstine, 
Hillman, and then Vice President George H.W. Bush on Air Force Two in the late 1980s
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Hillman and Pittsburgh Mayor Sophie Masloff (one of many friends of Hillman’s who were Democratic 
Party leaders) don their babushkas before a visit to the city by then First Lady Barbara Bush. 
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Although she fought against the party’s adopted platform that year, Hillman, pictured here holding 
a	flag	at	the	Republican	National	Convention	in	San	Diego,	continued	to	back	the	1996	Republican	
ticket of presidential candidate Bob Dole and vice presidential candidate Jack Kemp. 
Hillman and Allegheny County Executive Jim Roddey converse during the 
2000 Republican National Convention in Philadelphia.
C
O
P
yR
IG
H
T 
©
, P
it
ts
b
u
r
g
h
 P
o
st
-g
a
ze
tt
e
, 2
01
2,
 A
ll
 R
IG
H
TS
 R
ES
ER
VE
D
. R
EP
R
IN
TE
D
 W
IT
H
 P
ER
M
IS
SI
O
N
.
61
At Hillman’s 1996 retirement breakfast in Pittsburgh, Governor Tom Ridge and President George  
H.W. Bush join Hillman on stage to thank her.
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Elsie Hillman, who George H.W. Bush later called his “secret weapon in Pennsylvania,” joins the candidate 
for his campaign across the state in the 1980 Republican primary.
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
C H A P T E R  F O U R
C a s e s  i n  P o i n t
George H. W. Bush 
 Pittsburghers love the reaction visitors have as they drive out  
of	the	Fort	Pitt	tunnel	and	catch	their	first	glimpse	of	the	downtown	
skyline—a	striking	picture	of	office	buildings	straight	ahead,	the	rivers	
below, and Point State Park’s fountain to their left. 
 Then California Governor Ronald Reagan likely had a different 
reaction when his motorcade drove into Pittsburgh during the 1980 
primary season. Although he already had won the largest share of  
delegates in state primaries, his campaign staffers were unnerved by  
the slide in his support in Pennsylvania at the hands of his strongest 
rival, former United Nations Ambassador George H.W. Bush. Sensing 
the need to bolster Reagan’s standing, they had changed his schedule 
so that Reagan could speak in Pittsburgh. 
 Elsie Hillman intended to show Reagan and the media that Penn-
sylvania was Bush territory. Knowing that Reagan would be coming 
into	the	area,	she	and	Ron	Kaufman,	a	Massachusetts	native	and	field	
representative for the national Bush for President campaign, came up 
with an idea. 
 “It was Friday night at midnight,” recalled Kaufman, “and we said, 
‘How about if we get a hot air balloon, anchor it at Point State Park, 
and put a big sign on it?’ ” He and Hillman got to work, calling their 
network of friends and volunteers to locate the balloon and drive it  
into the city of Pittsburgh from 80 miles away, calling the state park 
commissioner	to	get	a	permit,	and	having	a	huge	sign	flown	in	from	
Iowa. “Sure enough, at 5 in the morning on the Monday that Reagan 
was going to drive in, up went the balloon.”   
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 As Reagan and his team emerged from the tunnel, they would have 
seen that beautiful Pittsburgh skyline—and a stories-high hot air balloon 
with a sign reading “George Bush for President.”  
 Hillman had begun promoting Bush as a potential candidate as 
early as 1978, and she became his campaign cochair in Pennsylvania 
and a member of his national steering committee. For Bush’s introduction 
to Pennsylvania, Hillman organized a breakfast in Pittsburgh, pricing 
the event at cost and with a nod to the election year ($19.80). It turned 
out to be Bush’s largest event of the primary season, with 1,100 people 
eating bacon and eggs at the William Penn Hotel in downtown Pitts-
burgh.63 Kaufman said that the breakfast was what former Republican 
National Committee Chair Lee Atwater called an “invisible primary,” 
an event that signals to people that a candidate has a groundswell of 
support. “That says, ‘Wow, this guy has something going for him if he 
can get 1,000 people.’” 
  Such demonstrations of support were crucial to the Bush campaign, 
which intended to show that his momentum was building and that, 
while Reagan might have support of the party apparatus, it was Bush 
who could win the popular vote. Because Drew Lewis and other state 
party leaders had gathered verbal commitments for Reagan from at 
least 50 of the state’s delegates, going after the popular vote was, in 
part, a default strategy. But Hillman believed that Bush would win the 
popular vote because most Pennsylvania Republicans were moderates. 
This was a state that had chosen senators like John Heinz and governors 
like	Dick	Thornburgh;	they	would	find	Reagan	too	conservative.	
 Hillman began by approaching Republican state legislators in the 
western	part	of	the	state	who	were	influential	with	voters	in	their	districts	
and then worked to build a grassroots movement for Bush. “I knew a 
lot of the leaders and residents of the state,” she said. “We just went 
district by district, setting up volunteers who would organize the vote. 
I had only one paid staff person, Mark Holman, and he worked state-
wide. But we had names of people in all the congressional districts 
who’d been down into the local committee districts.” Holman said that 
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they put together “a phenomenal grassroots campaign” that was very  
well organized. It also helped that Hillman was “absolutely determined  
to call in every chit, to do everything she could, to get Bush elected.”
 But while Hillman, Holman, and others in the campaign were busy 
generating support for Bush across Pennsylvania, the candidate was  
considering withdrawing from the race. Bush had started out strong in 
Iowa that January, winning the caucuses and rolling into New Hampshire 
as the man to beat. But he lost New Hampshire after Reagan outmaneu-
vered him just before a debate in Nashua, and his losses mounted in one 
high-delegate state after another. By April, Reagan was nearly halfway to 
the total number of delegates that he needed to secure the nomination.
 Hillman and others urged Bush to stay in the race. Bush later told 
Hillman that, without her support, he would not have pressed on in 1980. 
The national political director for his campaign, David Keene, said that 
Bush decided to remain in the Pennsylvania primary to show Republicans 
that he was their best future candidate. “We weren’t playing for the vice 
presidency, but we were certainly playing to an extent to make a point 
and playing for George Bush’s future.”64
 For Reagan’s part, he hoped to score a victory in Pennsylvania  
without having to spend much more money before the general election. 
The growing number of Bush supporters in the state would frustrate  
his plans.
Activating Hillman’s network
 Kaufman was working for the Bush campaign in New England when 
campaign manager James Baker summoned him to Philadelphia just 
weeks before the Pennsylvania primary. “We were behind by 15 points,  
20 points. Baker goes around the room and gives everybody an assignment 
except me. I said, ‘Well, I’m here.’ And he says, ‘Yeah, here’s your job. 
You’re going to go over the hill and go to Pittsburgh. There’s this crazy 
lady there and your job is to keep her out of my hair.’
 “So I get in my car,” said Kaufman, “and I drive over the mountains 
and	go	to	Elsie’s	office.	I	said,	‘Hi,	I’m	from	the	national	campaign,	here	 
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to help.’ She looked at me and said, ‘Yeah. Come with me.’ We go down-
stairs and the doorman knows her. That’s pretty cool. We get into a cab 
and the cabbie knows her. That’s pretty cool. We go over to the Hilton 
Hotel, had some lunch, and the doorman there knows her. That’s pretty 
interesting. We go and meet some guy named Tony O’Reilly [CEO of 
the H.J. Heinz Company]. She knew everybody.” 
 The fact that Hillman was speaking with every person and group 
she knew, from ethnic organizations in their clubs to unions in their 
meeting halls, was proving to be helpful to Bush. But the campaign 
staff balked at some of her ideas. One of these came to her as she real-
ized that the convention of the state AFL-CIO would be in Pittsburgh 
just before the primary. Kaufman remembered her saying, “Let’s get 
the state convention of the AFL-CIO to invite George to speak.” He told 
her, “I don’t think that’s a good idea. And why would they invite us?”
 She urged him to call Baker anyway. “So I call up Jim Baker and 
say, ‘Jim, what do you think about having Mr. Bush speak to the state 
convention of the AFL-CIO?’ He said, ‘What, are you nuts? That’s a 
terrible idea.’ I say, ‘Okay, good. Right, sir.’ I tell this to Elsie and she 
says, ‘No, we’re going to do it. Come with me.’ So we end up going to 
some hotel room where the convention is, and we go and meet this 
priest from New Jersey. And he’s in charge of the program. And I’ll 
never	figure	out	how	some	priest	from	New	Jersey	who	is	in	charge	 
of the program was a pal of Elsie’s, but this is Elsie.
	 “We	get	the	official	invite	and	I	send	it	to	Baker.	I’m	just	a	punk	
kid, I don’t know what I’m doing, and I’m talking with Baker, who’s 
God. He said, ‘What did I tell you?’... So, I go to Elsie and say that he 
said no. She said, ‘Listen, you and I are getting on that phone together.’ 
Elsie dials the number and puts it on speakerphone, and Jim Baker  
answers it. I say, ‘Hi, Mr. Baker. We want to relitigate this whole 
thing. It’s really important. We think his message is going great and 
that he’s saying the right things. And these guys are going to respect 
him.’ Baker said to me, ‘Okay, here’s the deal: We’ll do it. But if it 
doesn’t	work,	you’re	fired.’	”
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 To get an idea of what Bush was in for, Kaufman snuck into the 
convention to hear Walter Mondale’s speech. “They boo Mondale, so 
I think, ‘This is interesting. They’re booing Mondale, who’s kind of a 
labor guy, and the vice president of the United States, and a Democrat. 
What are they going to do to Bush?’ So I started to get my résumé 
going. And then Bush came in, and he gave an awesome speech and 
knocked them dead, with cheering crowds.” 
 The Post-Gazette account of Bush’s speech said, “Republican George 
Bush,	who	found	it	difficult	to	smile	in	a	crowd	a	year	ago,	has	come	
full circle to a broad humor that yesterday won the applause, if not the 
votes of delegates to the annual AFL-CIO convention here.”65 Hillman  
had helped to send a message to Republicans across the country: 
George Bush could appeal to people outside the traditional party base 
and he could win in a general election.
 While Kaufman and Hillman were planning the event with orga-
nized labor, Holman and Kevin Talley (who later would run Heinz’s 
campaigns	and	serve	as	his	chief	of	staff)	were	working	on	another	first	
for Bush: his “people’s press conference,” which was held at the Lithu-
anian Club in the South Side neighborhood of Pittsburgh. In an hour-
long open session with citizens and the press, Bush answered questions 
with	confidence	and	knowledge.	The	campaign	had	purchased	airtime	on	
all three of the region’s networks, so thousands of viewers in the region 
saw the broadcast.
 After these events and the additional media coverage they generated, 
Bush’s numbers in Pennsylvania started to move. The New York Times 
reported that, just prior to the Pennsylvania primary, “all polls and 
most political experts were giving Mr. Reagan a wide lead in the Penn-
sylvania	race.	But	they	began	to	find	that	the	Bush	campaign	has	made 
inroads in the last 10 days, enough to bring [Reagan] back to the state.”66
 Hillman called upon her network for one last event: an outdoor 
rally for Bush in downtown Pittsburgh on the day before the primary. 
Talley	remembers	being	concerned	that	this	could	reflect	badly	on	Bush	
if too few volunteers turned out for the rally. But Hillman had called 
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the leaders she knew in neighborhoods, churches, and unions and her 
taxicab-driving friends. They came out to cheer for Bush. 
 “We ended up winning Pennsylvania by eight points,” said 
Kaufman. “And we won Western Pennsylvania, which was a shock  
to everybody. And I kept my job.” 
 Bush went on to surprising wins in the key states of Texas and 
Michigan. But by mid-May, Reagan had the delegates he needed to  
win the nomination at the Republican convention in Detroit that July. 
The remaining drama within the party was over Reagan’s choice for 
vice president.
	 After	days	of	discussions	with	Gerald	Ford	(Reagan’s	first	choice	for	
vice president), Reagan called Bush late in the night of July 16 to ask 
him to be his running mate. Just after midnight, Reagan walked into 
Joe Louis Arena in Detroit to announce his choice to the delegates still 
gathered there. The Pittsburgh Press reporter who was present among 
the state’s delegates wrote, “Pennsylvania’s ‘Push for Bush’ drive 
finally	succeeded	late	last	night	after	it	seemed	that	the	Bush	bubble	
had burst.” He quoted Hillman as saying, “I’ve never had so many ups 
and downs.”67
  Why did Reagan choose Bush? Reagan’s campaign research had 
shown that “with George Bush, we had a moderate who could, in fact, 
attract a constituency in the suburbs North and South,” according to 
Richard Wirthlin, deputy director of strategy and planning for the 
Reagan-Bush Committee.68 Reagan also knew he needed to broaden his 
appeal among the wider base if he was going to succeed in the general 
election, and Bush had proved he could appeal to unions and ethnic 
groups through his win in blue-collar states like Pennsylvania and 
Michigan. Kaufman believed it was not just the wins. “It was the way 
we won ... the fact that Bush put together this kind of organization in 
a state like Pennsylvania, where he didn’t have any real ties; the fact 
that he picked up disaffected Democrats; and the types of people  
he attracted.”
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 Many of those same people would be ready to work for Bush when 
he ran for president again in 1988. 
 Key dates in the Republican Primary, 1980
 January 21 Iowa (caucuses)
 February 26 New Hampshire
 March 4 Massachusetts and Vermont
 March 8 South Carolina
 March 11 Alabama, Florida, and Georgia
 March 18 Illinois
 March 25 Connecticut and New York
 April 1 Kansas and Wisconsin
 April 22 Pennsylvania
 May 3 Texas
 May 6 Washington, D.C.; Indiana;    
  North Carolina; and Tennessee
 May 20 Michigan and Oregon
 May 24 Arizona and Delaware
 May 26 Bush withdraws from the race
 June 3 Super Tuesday
 (From The Campaign for President: 1980 in Retrospect,  
 Jonathan Moore, ed.)69
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Elsie Hillman led Doris Carson Williams’ “kitchen cabinet” during her Pittsburgh City Council campaign 
and continued to back Carson Williams’ rise within the Republican State Committee.
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Doris Carson Williams
	 Doris	Carson	Williams	had	just	finished	college	in	Connecticut	and	
was the host of a radio program there when a friend stopped by on a 
voter registration drive. Remembering that her great-grandparents had 
been Republicans and not thinking it mattered much in the 1970s, Carson 
Williams registered as a Republican that day. “I didn’t know it was a big 
deal until I came home to Pittsburgh and announced it at the dinner table 
to my grandfather, who I thought was going to have a stroke,” she said. 
In spite of pressure from her family, she did not change her registration. 
“You know I’m left-handed and I am a Republican.” 
 Carson Williams moved back to Pittsburgh to work as a marketing 
representative and decided to get involved in the Republican Party  
because	she	wanted	to	see	more	African	Americans	in	office.	She	also	 
felt that “you can work your way to the top faster in the Republican 
Party than you can in the Democratic Party. The Republican Party has 
less of a hierarchical structure.”70 She had a friend who introduced her to 
Wendell Freeland, and they began working on forming the Young Black 
Republican Council. “We wanted to increase the number of registered 
Black Republicans, we wanted to provide a vehicle for young Black  
Republicans	to	run	for	office,	and	we	wanted	to	support	the	Peirce	 
campaign.” (Robert Peirce was elected Allegheny County commissioner 
in 1975.) While she worked on the council and Peirce’s campaign, she 
and her mother and her mothers’ friends also recruited what they called 
“foot soldiers” for the party from among their friends and neighbors.
 The Republican Party may have been less hierarchical, but it was  
not uniformly welcoming of the efforts of this African American woman. 
“At	first,	party	members	totally	ignored	us	with	their	ignorant	attitudes,”	
she said in a newspaper article in the late 1970s. “But we were persis-
tent. We went all out for Peirce—door to door ... And we won.” Carson 
Williams said in that same article, “White Republicans are beginning  
to realize that in order to win you have to seek Black support. Black  
voters do not make up the majority, but they provide enough votes as  
a bloc to make the difference.”71
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 Carson Williams’ own opportunity to run came early in 1977, when  
a Pittsburgh City Council member had to resign for health reasons. 
Democrats and Republicans had just 90 days to choose candidates  
and run citywide campaigns, and Freeland, Carson Williams’ friend  
Billy Webb, and others who knew Carson Williams urged her to run.  
Not realizing that it was almost a certainty that a Republican would  
not be elected to council in the City of Pittsburgh, she agreed to run. 
 First, though, she had to get the party’s endorsement, which meant 
going	to	a	special	meeting	of	officials	at	Elsie	Hillman’s	home	in	Pitts-
burgh. “We went to Elsie’s house, and she had all this food prepared. 
She was very friendly, very unassuming. I didn’t know that she was 
Mrs. Elsie Hillman, the national committeewoman. She was a normal 
person and didn’t act like what I thought this person would.” After  
hearing Carson Williams and the other potential candidate, the party 
leaders decided to endorse Carson Williams, and she and Hillman got  
to work on the campaign.
 “The next day, Elsie said, ‘We have to set up the campaign hierarchy. 
John Heinz will be your campaign chairman and Dick Schweiker will  
be your honorary campaign chairman.’ She put together a committee  
of 10 people. I immediately ran to the library to do some research.  
I couldn’t say, ‘Well, I just moved back to Pittsburgh so I don’t really 
know or remember all of these people.’ ”
 In thinking back on that period of time, Carson Williams realized 
that Hillman had stepped forward to help her on the heels of two other 
major campaigns. Throughout 1976, Hillman had worked on Gerald 
Ford’s	presidential	campaign,	including	serving	as	floor	leader	at	the	
Republican National Convention, and she had chaired the Labor for 
Heinz Committee during John Heinz’s run for the U.S. Senate. Carson 
Williams said that Hillman treated her as if she were a candidate for major 
office.	“She	acted	like	I	was	running	to	move	into	the	White	House.”
 Heinz, Freeland, and Hillman introduced her to voters and donors, 
contacted the media for interviews, and put together dinners with  
potential donors. Hillman persuaded people like philanthropist  
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Helen Frick to make contributions to the campaign, and Elsie and 
Henry	Hillman	and	Heinz	each	gave	significant	sums	to	the	campaign	
as well. Watching Elsie Hillman bring one supporter after another to 
help her, Carson Williams was impressed by Hillman’s optimism, her 
sense that “there was always something else that you could do,” and 
her respect for people. “It was always about the pleases and thank-yous 
and dignity and respect,” said Carson Williams. 
	 The	campaign	team	would	meet	in	Freeland’s	office	in	the	Plaza	
Building to stuff envelopes and strategize. “She had endless energy,” 
said Carson Williams. “Elsie would have an idea of how to get in front 
of labor, for example. ‘Doris, you have to meet so-and-so.’ Or that I 
needed a ‘kitchen cabinet’ of people who could give me an idea of what 
John Q. Public wanted to know and what the street committee was 
talking	about.”	Whenever	Carson	Williams	was	not	in	Freeland’s	office	
or at work, she was in Pittsburgh’s neighborhoods. “I ran citywide and  
visited every neighborhood, almost every nook and cranny. I visited 
places I didn’t even know existed in the city. And I grew up here.”
 As most people expected, however, Carson Williams lost the election. 
But she had come closer to winning a citywide race than any other 
Republican in 50 years, losing by just 2,400 votes. “The newspapers 
talked about that for so long, you’d have thought I’d won,” she said.  
But for the candidate, reality set in the next day. “It’s like poof, the  
excitement all ends. I felt like my bubble had burst. ... But I could only 
be but so disappointed because Elsie told me, ‘You have done yourself 
such a great honor and the African American community. And African 
American women, as well.’ She was sharing a dignity and respect  
story with me,” said Carson Williams.
 In the years to come, Carson Williams would rise in the ranks of 
the	Republican	Party,	beginning	with	her	selection	as	an	officer	of	the	
Republican Committee of Allegheny County and her election as Repub-
lican state committeewoman. When Hillman urged her to run for one 
of the leadership positions of the Republican State Committee, Carson 
Williams hesitated, because she thought committee members outside 
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of Pittsburgh and Allegheny County did not know her. Hillman told her, 
“Well, you’re going to write them a letter and then you’re going to call 
them.”	So	every	day	after	she	finished	work,	Carson	Williams	would	 
go to the Hillmans’ house to make telephone calls. “I would ring the 
doorbell and Elsie would come to the door, big smile, dressed in her  
blue	jeans.	She’d	say,	‘Come	in,	dear!’	and	we’d	go	upstairs	to	her	office.	
She’d say, ‘You want coffee or tea or something to eat?’ She had the  
telephone lists, and I would call the state committee members.” By the 
time of the election by state committee members that year, “everybody 
knew who I was,” said Carson Williams. She won big, going on to serve 
as the deputy committee chair for the Republican State Committee. 
 Carson Williams and Hillman would work together for more than 
25 years at both state and national levels, bringing together Republican 
National	Committee	members	and	the	officers	of	the	National	Black	 
Republican Council; working for the campaigns of Dick Thornburgh, 
George H.W. Bush, and William Scranton III; and persuading the party  
to	support	African	American	candidates	for	city	and	county	offices.
 Working with Hillman over the years was “a classic, textbook case  
on why to be involved and the value of relationships,” said Carson  
Williams. “If you were in, she was in, and vice versa; we never said no. 
You knew you would be in good company. For us at that time, we got to 
see	the	benefit	of	our	involvement	right	away.	It	wasn’t	like	you	had	 
to wait 15 years.”
75
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Elsie Hillman supported Dick Thornburgh from the start of his political career. They are pictured here  
at the 1986 Lincoln Day dinner. 
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Dick Thornburgh 
 When the Republican Party nominated Barry Goldwater for presi-
dent in 1964, attorney Dick Thornburgh was frustrated and angry.  
After Goldwater then lost in the general election, Thornburgh decided 
to write a letter to the editor saying that the moderates in the party had 
allowed it to be infused by “a brand of fanatic political extremism which 
rallied nearly every right-wing fringe group in the nation.” He wrote, 
“We must, beginning today, start the job of rebuilding our party.”72
 Elsie Hillman read the letter in the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette and 
called Thornburgh. Would he like to come talk with her about what  
to do? Thornburgh later joined her and a small group of people who  
occasionally	met	after	work	at	lawyer	Al	Capozzi’s	offices	to	strategize	
about how to strengthen the local Republican Party and to choose  
moderate	candidates	for	office.	
 Hillman called Thornburgh again in February 1965 to ask him to 
meet with several of the Allegheny County Republican Party’s leaders,  
including George Pott, the Allegheny County chair. They wanted to talk 
with Thornburgh about the idea of his running for mayor of the City 
of Pittsburgh. Thornburgh said, “I gulped a little bit and said, ‘Well ...’ 
Elsie said, ‘You told me you were interested in politics!’ ” Thornburgh 
prepared for that meeting by telephoning the man who was running 
John Lindsay’s campaign for mayor of New York City. He advised 
Thornburgh to make three demands. 
 When he got to the meeting with Pott and the ward chairs, Thorn-
burgh presented those three requests. He laughed as he remembered 
what happened: “It was like a series of trip-hammer blows to these guys. 
First I tell them I’m going to run the campaign—what the hell did I know  
about running a campaign? Then, that I’m going to control all the patron-
age once I’m in city hall—right, that was their lifeblood, they would get 
these jobs from Bill Scranton in Harrisburg. And third, that I needed 
a war chest of half a million dollars. The notion of raising a half million 
bucks for some untried kid—for anybody—was so unthinkable to them.” 
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Thornburgh and the leadership did not come to an agreement that 
day, and his three optimistic conditions saved him from what likely 
would	have	been	a	losing	run	for	office.	No	Republican	had	won	a	mayoral	
race in the City of Pittsburgh since the 1930s and the candidate the 
Republicans ultimately ran in the 1965 race was defeated soundly.
 Thornburgh continued to meet with Hillman, Capozzi, and the 
other members of the group that called itself the 007s, becoming a  
valued member because he had a coherent vision for what the party 
could be. He and John Heinz III worked on putting that vision into 
words and developed the idea of forming the Pittsburgh Republican 
Forum to attract younger people to the party and give them an entry 
point	as	volunteers	and	potential	candidates	for	office.	
 At the urging of his fellow moderates, Thornburgh agreed to run 
for U.S. Congress in 1966. This time, he understood that he would be 
a	“sacrificial	lamb,”	because	he	would	be	running	against	the	popular	
incumbent, William Moorhead; no one expected him to do better than 
the usual one Republican vote for every three Democratic votes. Even 
Thornburgh’s announcement that he was a candidate barely made  
the newspapers. But he was, by his own description, able to “become a 
large-sized	pain	to	Bill	Moorhead”	by	disclosing	his	own	family’s	finances	
and	calling	for	Moorhead	to	do	the	same.	This	was	before	financial	 
disclosure laws, so Moorhead, who was a wealthy man elected in a  
working-class district, avoided the question and never did reveal his 
income or assets. In striking this slight blow, Thornburgh began to 
establish an image as a candidate of integrity. 
 Hillman rolled up her sleeves to work for Thornburgh during  
that congressional campaign. “She worked at our headquarters, she  
put me in touch with people, she helped raise money,” said Thornburgh. 
In spite of the excitement he generated among Republican volunteers, 
however, Thornburgh lost the race. But he had done much better  
than anyone had expected, narrowing the usual rate of defeat to two  
to one. People in the Republican Party began to think of him as a  
serious candidate. 
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 Thornburgh volunteered for the American Civil Liberties Union 
(ACLU) and served on the board of Neighborhood Legal Services,  
providing pro bono legal assistance. When Martin Luther King Jr. was  
assassinated in April 1968, one of Thornburgh’s colleagues in the ACLU 
who was a Democrat called to ask him for help. Some protesters had 
been arrested in the Hill District of Pittsburgh and were being held at 
the jail. Could he join in the defense of these men? It would help to have  
attorneys who were Republicans in among the Democrats working to  
free them. Thornburgh agreed to help. 
 His defense of the protesters was in character for Thornburgh, who 
earlier had come to the aid of Nate Smith when he was arrested during  
a demonstration about minority hiring. Smith said of Thornburgh’s  
actions to free him from jail, “He worked for four days. He walked me  
out	of	there	with	flying	colors.”73 Smith never forgot Thornburgh’s support 
and returned the favor 10 years later by supporting Thornburgh when  
he	ran	for	statewide	office.	
 Later in 1968, H.J. Heinz II, chair and CEO of the H.J. Heinz Company, 
asked Thornburgh to help with New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller’s 
presidential primary election run, and Thornburgh became the Western 
Pennsylvania chair for the Rockefeller campaign. To the disappointment  
of moderates, Richard Nixon won the nomination at the Republican  
convention in Miami Beach that year. 
 Given Thornburgh’s role in the Rockefeller campaign, Nixon must 
have had to swallow hard when he named Thornburgh the U.S. attorney  
for the Western District of Pennsylvania soon after he was elected. 
Thornburgh was not the choice of Nixon’s supporters in Allegheny County; 
 Robert Duggan had backed the appointment of one of his assistant district 
attorneys	to	the	office.74 But Hillman had pushed Thornburgh’s name 
with Senator Hugh Scott, and Nixon needed Scott’s support as minority 
leader, so Thornburgh got the position. 
	 Thornburgh	quickly	earned	a	reputation	for	fighting	corruption	and	
organized crime. Using the Organized Crime Control Act that was signed 
just prior to his appointment, he investigated the network of people who 
80
had long been involved in illegal gambling and payoffs to detectives and 
others in law enforcement. His investigation led to the conclusion that 
officers	were	protecting	the	mob	network’s	leaders	from	prosecution	by	
tipping them off about raids and looking the other way as they committed 
crimes	that	generated	millions	of	dollars	each	year.	Thornburgh’s	office,	
with the FBI and the Internal Revenue Service, believed that the system 
of	payoffs	extended	to	the	office	of	Duggan,	the	Allegheny	County	district	
attorney. Thornburgh brought these accusations before a federal grand 
jury and on March 4, 1974, they “returned an eight-count indictment 
against Duggan.” That same day, Duggan took his own life.75
	 Thornburgh’s	tenure	as	U.S.	attorney,	filled	with	successful	 
prosecutions in Western Pennsylvania and the conviction of more than 
40	government	officials,	proved	that	he	would	work	in	the	public	interest,	
which placed him in stark contrast to the corruption being reported at 
the time. “Corruption penetrated all levels of government in Pennsylvania,” 
historians Philip Klein and Ari Hoogenboom wrote. They reported that 
The Philadelphia Bulletin calculated that “238 Pennsylvania public  
officials	from	1970	to	1978	were	convicted	of,	admitted	to,	or	pleaded	 
‘no contest’ to charges of corruption. ... As a result, by 1978 many voters 
equated the Pennsylvania Democratic Party with corruption and, despite
its 900,000 edge over Republicans in registered voters, it was in trouble.”76 
Republicans stood a good chance of winning the next race for governor, 
and Thornburgh had an outside shot at securing his party’s nomination.
Gubernatorial primary  
 A number of Republicans jumped into the gubernatorial primary 
election in 1978. When Thornburgh entered, he was the only one from 
the western part of Pennsylvania. He had the Republican Committee  
of Allegheny County’s endorsement, which was due in large part to  
Hillman’s support. 
	 Thornburgh	first	had	to	face	three	challengers	put	forward	by	more	
conservative party members in the county. Knowing this, Hillman had 
gathered committee votes for Thornburgh and pulled out all the stops. 
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The night of the endorsement, “the other three candidates were on the 
dais, waiting to give their pitches to the voters,” remembered Jim Seif, 
who worked on Thornburgh’s campaign. “The next thing you know,  
the brass band that Elsie had hired strikes up—no one knew there was 
going to be a band at this thing—and Dick and Elsie walk in, arm in 
arm. And all of Elsie’s supporters in the crowd, the committee people 
she had known and recruited, they went nuts.” Thornburgh won the 
endorsement that night.
 In his campaign, Thornburgh became known for being willing  
to go just about anywhere, speaking to hundreds or handfuls. Murray 
Dickman, who also was a key staffer in the campaign, said that Hillman 
was crucial in that primary race. “She allowed us to establish credibility, 
which, essentially, we rode on,” said Dickman. “Everywhere we went  
in the primary was because of somebody Elsie knew.” Hillman said 
that Andy Gleason, chair of the Cambria County Republican Committee, 
opened doors, campaigning with her all across the state on behalf  
of Thornburgh. 
 Thornburgh’s primary run was strong on enthusiasm but short  
on money. When it became clear that the campaign could not continue 
without more funding, Hillman went to H.J. Heinz II to ask his family  
to join the Hillmans in making the sizable contributions that kept  
Thornburgh in the primary. Of the $1 million Thornburgh spent in  
the	primary,	one-fifth	came	from	the	Heinz	family.77 
 Hillman also introduced Thornburgh’s team to the labor unions in 
the southwestern part of the state, bringing Thornburgh to meet union 
leaders and hosting parties in her home. “You never were quite sure 
who was going to show up,” said Dickman. It could be a union leader;  
or the president; “or, most likely, both. You just were never quite sure.”
 Her connections could be a mixed blessing for Thornburgh, however. 
He wanted union support, but Thornburgh’s team knew that, if he won, 
there could be an “ask.” “It never was anything blatant, but you knew. 
Dick Thornburgh being Dick Thornburgh, you couldn’t do those ‘debts,’ ” 
said one of his advisors. 
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 Thornburgh was determined to steer a different course on state 
jobs and other patronage. He would still link some jobs to election  
support, but nothing like the system that county chairs and union leaders 
had come to expect. It was in the public interest to hire employees on 
merit, and he wanted to distinguish himself from the tainted system 
that was then so much in the news. Thornburgh also was determined 
to cut the total number of state jobs to save money, so it would be  
inevitable that a Thornburgh administration would have fewer jobs for 
the party faithful.
 But this was not something that was apparent to the unions or county 
chairs who Hillman was courting on Thornburgh’s behalf in 1978.
General election
 During an expensive primary, Thornburgh beat the candidates 
from the eastern part of the state and began to campaign against the 
Democrats’ candidate, former Pittsburgh mayor Pete Flaherty. 
 In many ways, Flaherty appeared to be the ideal nominee. He had 
nurtured a reputation as an independent actor, calling himself “nobody’s 
boy,” and had worked as a deputy attorney general in President Jimmy 
Carter’s justice department. In theory, he could be the antidote to the 
reputation of corruption that the Democrats had developed. His running 
mate shared the same name as the state’s popular auditor general  
(and future governor) Robert Casey. And Flaherty had a broad smile 
and a shock of brown hair that reminded some of John F. Kennedy. 
One of Thornburgh’s campaign staffers said that, after seeing Flaherty 
dancing	with	an	old	woman	in	his	first	TV	ad,	he	told	his	boss,	“I	almost	
wanted to vote for him, it was so good.” 
 Flaherty started the race more than 30 points ahead of Thornburgh. 
But Thornburgh followed a carefully drawn plan to close the gap during 
the summer and fall, using his own list of advantages. These included 
a smart, loyal campaign team; a set of political friends he had met 
through his participation as an elected delegate at the Pennsylvania 
Constitutional Convention a decade earlier; and his running mate,  
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the Republican candidate for lieutenant governor, William Scranton III 
(Governor William Scranton’s son), who provided a cross-state balance 
and was far better known and more experienced than “the wrong Bob 
Casey,” as Thornburgh’s campaign staff called Flaherty’s running 
mate.	Thornburgh	also	had	a	consistent	three-point	platform:	fighting	
corruption, creating jobs, and responsible state spending.
 Because Thornburgh was stronger in Southwestern Pennsylvania 
than in the eastern part of the state, his team decided to run a strategy 
that focused on Philadelphia and the southeastern suburbs, relying 
in part on Montgomery County Republican Committee Chair Robert 
Asher; Billy Meehan; and the other “kings” of eastern Pennsylvania  
Republican Party politics, who could activate their networks of volunteers. 
They did deliver for Thornburgh, in spite of some lingering regrets about 
the defeat of the candidates they had put forward in the primary from 
their own counties. The party leaders accepted Thornburgh’s nomination, 
“but	not	happily,”	according	to	one	party	official.
 Winning in Pennsylvania that year, when Democrats had 900,000 
more registrants than Republicans, would require Thornburgh to sway 
a substantial number of Democrats, including voters from two tradi-
tionally Democratic groups: labor unions and African American voters. 
Thornburgh has said that Hillman was “responsible for the fact that 
we got such heavy support from labor,” and Marylou Stefanko of the 
Pennsylvania State Education Association remembered that Hillman’s 
connections in the Pittsburgh area helped to open the door to her coun-
terparts in the east. “You know Dick Thornburgh had little identity in 
the eastern part of the state. I brought Dick Thornburgh to the PACE 
[Political Action Committee for Education] board, and they were asking, 
‘He’s	the	Western	District	what?’	Hillman’s	support	helped	influence	
the board to endorse Thornburgh for governor.” Thornburgh ultimately 
would win 50 percent of labor votes in the state at a time when the 
share	of	labor	households	was	significantly	higher	than	it	is	today.
	 Hillman	also	had	a	direct	impact	on	raising	Thornburgh’s	profile	in	
the African American community, including in Philadelphia. She asked 
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Smith (who by that point was an important labor activist) if he could 
persuade civil rights leader and Democrat Jesse Jackson to endorse 
Thornburgh in a radio spot. Because of Smith’s friendship with Hillman 
and his gratitude to Thornburgh for defending him in 1968, Smith  
traveled to see Jackson on November 3, 1978, to ask him to make the 
recording. Jackson did, and Smith had the tape of the endorsement  
sent on to Philadelphia. Dickman, who was leading the campaign’s  
effort in Philadelphia, remembers when the brown envelope arrived  
in	his	office	with	a	tape	inside.	“We	played	it	and	sure	enough,	there’s	
Jesse Jackson saying, ‘I’m for Richard Thornburgh’ ”78  The Thornburgh 
campaign played that endorsement on radio stations in the Philadelphia 
area, and Hillman said that Jackson also told ministers in African 
American churches that they should support Thornburgh. “Elsie delivered 
it to us and that dramatically changed the campaign. ... We carried the 
Black vote for Philadelphia,” said Dickman. 
 Back in Pittsburgh, African American leaders were organizing  
meetings for Thornburgh throughout the city. In her postcampaign 
analysis of what African American leaders had done for Thornburgh’s 
campaign, Hillman wrote that this included raising funds to hire a  
coordinator	(who	worked	out	of	Hillman’s	office	downtown);	developing	
flyers	and	posters	that	they	distributed	to	40,000	people	in	Pittsburgh,	
Philadelphia, Erie, Scranton, and Harrisburg; paying for advertising; 
and engaging ministers and congregants in Black churches. She also 
noted that a leading Democrat who had “made contacts with Black  
leaders statewide, [and] church leaders in Pennsylvania ... spoke out  
in the Democratic primary against Pete Flaherty, put his name and 
reputation [behind Thornburgh] in the general election” and that  
“the key in this necessary election effort towards the Black vote was  
to convert anti-Flaherty sentiment into pro-Thornburgh activity. The 
Black Republican leadership in Allegheny County is credited by leading 
Black and White Dems in Western Pennsylvania. The next step is to  
be	credible	with	the	Black	leadership	for	the	long-term	benefit.”79
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 Hillman also sent Thornburgh the list of African American leaders 
who had worked on his campaign. It had more than 200 people on it, 
including civil rights leaders Harvey Adams, Byrd R. Brown, and LeRoy 
Patrick. In both Pittsburgh and Philadelphia, Thornburgh received the 
endorsement of the major African American newspapers. 
 On election day, Thornburgh won 58 percent of the Black vote,  
statewide—the margin in his 200,000-vote victory over Flaherty.
Changing the quid pro quo
 Many people who had worked hard for Thornburgh expected to be 
rewarded after he was elected. That was how it worked in Pennsylvania, 
whether the governor was a Democrat or a Republican. 
 But after the election, Thornburgh and his aides were delivering  
a consistent message: There would be very few patronage jobs. At a  
dinner to raise money to pay down campaign debt and build a small  
war chest, Thornburgh told 2,200 supporters, “The patronage plunder  
of the past will not recur.” (In his memoir, he wrote that a “shudder went 
through the crowd” after he said this.) At a Republican state committee 
meeting a few months later, he told party leaders that, of 102,000 state 
jobs, all but 4,000 were covered by the State Civil Service Commission, 
unions,	or	both.	And	of	those	4,000	jobs,	only	800	could	be	classified	as	
“policy making,” and the “U.S. Supreme Court [the 1976 decision Elrod v. 
Burns]	has	flatly	prohibited	the	firing	of	employees	in	nonpolicy	positions	
because	of	party	affiliations.”80 One of the committee members at the 
meeting, Bill McMillen, got a standing ovation when he asked, “What’s 
wrong with patronage? It’s not as bad as Civil Service, where you can’t 
lay	a	finger	on	the	bad	ones.”81 
 With just 800 jobs to distribute, Thornburgh was bound to disappoint 
the party leaders who had waited for eight years to get back into power 
and who remembered the 50,000 jobs available to Republicans under 
Governor Scranton. Mike Meehan, who is general counsel for the Repub-
lican City Committee in Philadelphia, said, “We idolized Scranton.  
He put people to work.” 
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 Meehan’s father, Billy, who was the leader of the Republican Party 
in	Philadelphia	when	Thornburgh	was	in	office,	said	of	the	new	governor, 
“All the jobs I have you could put in a telephone booth.”82 It wasn’t only 
about jobs for some political leaders. It was the millions of dollars in 
state	contracts	for	legal	and	financial	work,	for	construction,	and	for	
those “milk contracts” that Hillman had reluctantly managed when  
she was county chair. 
 To some extent, this disappointment transferred to Hillman. She 
was the early advocate for Thornburgh with a reluctant Republican 
state committee and, as the national committeewoman for the state, 
this would have been her big win. She got the brunt of the anger from 
party leaders through the telephone calls and letters that came when 
they learned that Thornburgh was ending patronage. 
 Traditional party members were not the only ones disappointed 
during the months following Thornburgh’s victory. African American 
volunteers in the campaign felt slighted by both Thornburgh and the 
party. Doris Carson Williams was listed in The Pittsburgh Press in 
1980 as “one of a number of prominent Republican Blacks who have 
protested ... against Thornburgh’s failure to hire Blacks from this part 
of the state.” An African American union organizer, Kermit White, 
spoke out at a meeting in 1980, saying, “Thornburgh has provided no 
jobs for Blacks, even though we worked our fool heads off for him.”83 
Hillman later said, “The Republican state committee just didn’t want 
to make them a part of the system.”
 Thornburgh said something similar. “We got 58 percent of the Black 
vote, but there was no way we could convert that into what it could 
have been by the time I got to Harrisburg. I mean, those folks wanted 
to be recognized and rewarded, and I was perfectly willing to do it,”  
but the party would not have it. “So it was a squandered opportunity.”
 The irony was this: Hillman had invested her skills and resources 
in a man who had promised to clean up state government but who would 
reduce the power of the party structure she respected. By disrupting the 
tried-and-true way of rewarding volunteers and donors, fewer people 
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came to fundraisers and fewer invested time in the hard work of getting 
out the message and turning out the vote. Meehan said, “At one point 
after Scranton was governor, we used to have dinners where we had 
5,000 people. In 1964, we got $100 a ticket and we sold 5,000. So we 
were raising $1 million a year in 1964 dollars.” 
 When Thornburgh ran for reelection in 1982, he would win by  
only 100,000 votes out of 3.6 million in the state. While he faced the 
problem of a terrible national economy and the usual problems of an 
incumbent, he also faced the consequences of his decision to decouple 
politics from governance.
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A	flyer	from	Barbara	Hafer’s	1990	gubernatorial	campaign
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Barbara Hafer
 The town of Elizabeth, Pa., is in the Mon Valley, which was the 
heart of the steel industry in Western Pennsylvania. When the mills 
began to shut down, Elizabeth, like dozens of other towns with no  
industry to replace steel, began to look very different. People left for 
work in Texas and Virginia, emptying the schools and leaving behind  
a	less	affluent	population.	
	 Barbara	Hafer,	a	public	health	nurse	from	Elizabeth,	saw	firsthand	
the toll that unemployment was taking on the Mon Valley. Because  
of her job and her outgoing nature, she became trusted as the person  
to	call	with	questions	about	where	to	find	help.	“People	were	lined	up	 
on my doorstep when I got home. They were desperate. I was kind of 
seen as a local resource. Every kid who was thrown out of their house 
would show up. I could pick up the phone and call and get somebody  
to a shelter.”
 When a state commission began to make grants to regions for new 
rape crisis centers, Hafer, with a small group of others in Allegheny 
County, put together a successful application for a victims’ rights organ- 
ization called the Rape Crisis Center. That group included Ellen Kight 
and Marge McGregor (married at the time to the attorney Jim McGregor, 
who	chaired	John	Heinz’s	first	campaign	for	Congress);	it	was	through	
their connections with the bipartisan National Women’s Political Caucus 
that	Hafer	first	met	Elsie	Hillman.	
 At that point, Hafer was active in the Democratic Party, but she  
was becoming frustrated by what she saw as a “caste system.” She had 
ambitions	of	running	for	office	but	felt	that	she	was	stuck	in	a	male-
dominated party that gave only lip service to female candidates and  
African Americans of either gender. “There was really no place for a 
young woman who was a feminist activist.”
 Hafer recalls the evening when the Women’s Political Caucus was 
having	its	meeting	at	Hillman’s	home	in	Pittsburgh.	“I	couldn’t	find	 
the house; I didn’t even know where I was going. I was a Democrat  
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committee person in Elizabeth Borough and I was a worker bee. So I get 
there and everybody was drinking wine and somebody was playing the 
piano, and all these women were all dressed up and they were eating 
little canapés. I decided I was going to help in the kitchen. And there 
was this woman in the kitchen, and I said, ‘I’m Barbara,’ and she said, 
‘I’m Elsie,’ and I said, ‘Everybody’s out there, why aren’t there any work-
ers in here?’ and she said, ‘I don’t know, dearie. I think it’s you and me.’ 
So we’re chopping cheese and sipping wine and I’m taking platters out 
and then she’d take platters out and we worked all evening. She said  
good night and I said good night. And I said, ‘Elsie, you’re a hell of a 
worker,’ and she said, ‘You are, too.’ She didn’t say who she was, and  
I wouldn’t have known who she was even if she had told me.”
 As Hillman continued to see Hafer at these meetings, she started 
to talk to her about becoming a Republican, explaining that her party 
wanted	to	support	women	running	for	office	and	that	Hafer	would	be	
a good candidate. After these discussions, Hafer not only changed her 
registration to Republican, she became the chair of the party for  
Elizabeth Borough (which had not had an active committee). She turned  
to Hillman for advice about what to do next. “Elsie knew you needed 
bodies. You needed grass roots; you needed a structure. So that’s what 
we did. We converted all of our friends, made them committee people.  
We ran a full-slated ticket ... the tax collector, the mayor, the council. 
So we started to build a base.”
 In 1983, Hafer decided she was ready to run for one of the three 
seats for Allegheny County commissioner. She and Ted Jacob, who 
owned	an	engineering	firm	and	had	run	for	Congress,	received	the	 
endorsement of the party’s executive committee—instead of the one  
Republican incumbent, William Hunt. Hafer traveled the county to 
campaign against Hunt in the primary, casting him as “Dr. No” because 
of his vote against a monorail transportation project that had been 
popular in the Mon Valley for its potential for creating manufacturing 
jobs. She also raised questions about the costs of a county commissioners-
backed plan for a new county jail.84 The political ads upset Hunt and 
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another incumbent, Democrat Tom Foerster, the chair of the county 
commissioners (who would become a dear friend of Hillman’s). They 
wanted Hafer to back off and asked Hillman to talk with her. 
 Hillman called a meeting at her home with Hafer and a man repre-
senting the county commissioners. Hafer explained her position on the 
jail costs and said, “I think it’s a legitimate issue, and I think the people 
should know how much it costs.” Hillman surprised her by turning to 
the commissioners’ liaison to say that Hafer was right. “Elsie Hillman 
played it straight and she had the interest of the people,” said Hafer. 
“She never put any pressure on me to do anything.”
 The press generated by her attacks on Hunt helped Hafer and Jacob 
to defeat Hunt in the primary. Hafer and Jacob would work (loosely)  
as a team, trying to win two of the three county commissioner spots,  
but no one expected this to happen. For many years, the race had ended 
with two Democrats and one Republican as county commissioners.  
Hafer	became	that	one	Republican—and	the	first	woman	elected	to	the	
Allegheny County Board of Commissioners. (The two Democrats elected 
as county commissioners in that race were Foerster and Pete Flaherty, 
the former mayor and gubernatorial candidate.) Hafer would prove to  
be a popular county commissioner, winning reelection in 1987.
 In 1988, the Republican state committee leaders were looking for  
a candidate to run for state treasurer against Catherine Baker Knoll,  
a Democrat from Allegheny County. They approached Hafer, who 
turned them down. She liked Knoll. She also had her eyes on the  
auditor	general’s	office.
 Running for auditor general was an unusual choice. It was tough 
enough to raise money for a statewide race, but for candidates for audi-
tor	general,	it	was	especially	difficult.	“Nobody	cared	about	the	auditor	 
general,”	said	Hafer.	“It’s	an	office	that	has	no	constituency,	even	
though	it’s	a	very	important	office	in	many,	many	ways.	...	Nobody	is	
going to make any money. There are no deals, there is nothing.” It also 
seemed foolish because she would be taking on the incumbent, Don Bailey, 
a Democrat and Vietnam veteran. 
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 Hafer entered the race without being sure how she would raise 
the $500,000 she needed to run the campaign. She went to Hillman, 
who agreed to contribute, and Hillman also agreed to cosign a loan  
or $200,000. A prominent Republican cosigned another loan for the 
same amount. 
 The contest between Hafer and Bailey was “one of the nastiest battles 
for auditor general in memory,” according to John J. Kennedy in his 
book, Pennsylvania Elections: Statewide Contests from 1950–2004,  
with each candidate leveling accusations of unethical behavior against 
the	other.	In	the	end,	Hafer	benefited	from	two	factors:	a	third-party	
candidate	in	the	race	who	leached	a	significant	share	of	Bailey’s	votes	
in Philadelphia and her popularity in Allegheny County, where she 
was “well known and popular enough among Democrats to pry away 
some of their votes.”85  She had her second victory over an incumbent.
	 Hafer	had	been	in	office	less	than	a	year	when	party	leaders	asked	
her if she would run for governor against Democrat Robert Casey Sr. 
It was clear to most that no Republican in the state could beat Casey. 
He would be running for his second term and had, according to Hafer, 
“finally	made	all	the	deals	and	got	the	coalitions	together.”	While	Hafer	
had just begun to understand state-level politics, she already knew that 
she would be the “placeholder” for U.S. Senator John Heinz or U.S. 
Representative Tom Ridge, both of whom were being talked about  
as gubernatorial candidates for the race four years hence. Hafer had  
aspirations to be governor, but she knew that the timing was wrong 
for her.
 But there were reasons for saying yes. She had ended the race for 
auditor general $400,000 in debt. Here would be her chance to raise  
the	money	to	pay	off	what	she	still	owed.	The	party	would	find	her	 
a	skilled	finance	chair	(Heinz),	it	offered	her	campaign	staff	support,	 
and Hillman would help her to put together a leadership group.  
Hafer agreed to run.
 What Hafer and her supporters did not realize was that her campaign 
would unintentionally help to organize a nascent movement of activists 
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in the state, people determined to undermine the moderate approach that 
Hillman had championed since she joined the Republican Party.
Race for governor
 The 1990 race started just months after Casey had signed a compre-
hensive set of laws restricting abortions in the state. The sharp contrast 
between Casey’s prolife position and Hafer’s prochoice views on abortion 
rights would cause many to cast Hafer as a “single-issue candidate,”  
even as she tried to highlight a broader swath of issues.
 An unexpected battle during the Republican primary did not help 
matters. Peg Luksik, who ran a home for single mothers in Johnstown, 
Pa., entered as the “antiabortion candidate.” Few in the party took her 
seriously, as Luksik had not been active in party politics prior to this  
election and abortion had not been a pivotal issue in elections before  
this point. But Luksik had a statewide network of prolife supporters,  
and she proved to be remarkably successful as an organizer. 
 At a time when Hafer desperately needed to save her money for 
the general election, Luksik’s growing strength forced Hafer to spend 
$400,000 in the primary. Hafer was able to defeat her, but Luksik still 
succeeded in getting 46 percent of the vote.86 She also made the election 
that year about abortion.
 Hafer might have been able to shift the focus to other issues but  
for some large obstacles. She did not have the network of supporters  
with	the	financial	incentives	(state	jobs	and	contracts)	to	work	for	her.	
She did not have the support of most people in the party apparatus,  
so she and her running mate, State Representative Harold Mowery Jr., 
often found themselves campaigning alone. And Luksik continued to  
hound her after the primary, gathering the supporters she had attracted  
to her campaign and teaching them how to “disseminate political know-
how” to oppose Hafer from within her own party and to organize protests  
at many of the places where Hafer spoke.87
 The fact that Casey started 47 points ahead in the polls only made  
the situation more dire and her candidacy less attractive to donors.  
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Hafer	raised	very	little	money	for	the	general	election	to	fill	the	hole	
dug during the primary. Without more contributions, she had no hope 
of getting her message out through radio and television advertising. 
 Those who had supported her candidacy were getting nervous 
about what a large defeat would mean down ticket. They feared that 
Republicans would not turn out at all, jeopardizing the races of candi-
dates in districts with tight elections. Hillman convened a group  
of party leaders to advise Hafer. Hillman started the meeting off this 
way:	“Barbara	is	our	figurehead,	our	symbol,	and	we	must	all	be	part	
of holding her up into the best light so that others can and will follow. 
... Each of us must put our individual concerns and feelings aside and 
must lean on and trust each other, keeping in mind that each of us 
does have a stake in the outcome of the campaign. ... The party leader-
ship must show active and strong support for the candidate.”88
 By that point, there already had been what Hillman termed “pretty 
rough political bumps,” including a remark that Hafer had made about 
Casey (she called him a “rednecked Irishman from Scranton,” which 
she has since said was an inexcusable thing to have done); her accusation 
that,	in	spite	of	prison	riots,	Casey	had	not	fired	the	prison	commissioner	
because the man was African American; and her ban on employees in 
her	office	taking	part	in	political	activities,	which	prompted	the	headline,	
“Hafer’s	Rules	Prohibit	All	but	Herself	from	Seeking	Office.”89 
 Hillman advised Hafer, “This does not mean disaster. It means 
paying very close attention to detail and perception. ... There are no 
decisions that you make, Barbara, that are not political.”90 
 Hafer worked hard that summer and fall, pressing the governor  
on his most vulnerable issue: the state budget. Wherever she spoke, 
she	told	voters	that	the	state	had	a	$1	billion	deficit,	not	the	surplus	
that Casey was claiming. (She later was proved to be correct. After  
the	election,	Casey	raised	taxes	by	a	record	amount	to	close	the	deficit.)	
“Hafer spent the summer campaigning hard as Casey handed out  
state funding checks and went to highway dedications,” wrote Harry  
Kloman in Pittsburgh Magazine.91 Although Kloman indicated that 
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Hafer crossed the state, speaking to “policemen, nursing homes, abortion  
rights supporters, realtors, and other groups,” she could not ignore the 
fact that she had no chance of catching up to Casey. 
 In July, she told Hillman and Anne Anstine that she was going to pull 
out of the race. Hillman would not hear of it. “Next thing I know,” said 
Hafer, “there’s Elsie driving up to Kiski [the Kiski School, where Hafer and 
her husband, Jack Pidgeon, the head of the school, then lived]. She said, 
‘Dearie, you cannot quit.’ She really laid a guilt trip on me! She said, ‘You’re 
the	first	woman	to	run.’	I	said,	‘Elsie,	we	have	no	money.	Nobody	except	
Arlen [Specter] will even campaign with me.’ ” It was about more than  
being broke. Hafer was demoralized by the treatment she was receiving  
in town after town. “They were out there with fetuses in glass jars, 
throwing blood on me and picketing. ... These weren’t Democrats.  
These were Republicans! So it was horrible. Just horrible. So Jack said,  
‘Elsie, you’ve got to do something.’ She said, ‘I will. You stay in the race.’ 
And she gathered everybody up and they all lined up at the capitol and 
they all said, ‘We’re with Hafer.’ ”Hillman continued to support Hafer, 
organizing press conferences and raising more money for her campaign 
through events she held in her home.
 But Casey had a wide lead in contributions, too. When campaign 
finance	reports	were	released	in	September	1990,	his	campaign	fund	 
was 20 times larger than Hafer’s. The Pittsburgh Post-Gazette reported, 
“While Casey has announced plans to spend up to $4 million on television 
advertising this fall, Hafer has struggled to attract contributions.”92
 Many in the party continued to work for Hafer until Election Day, 
including veteran Philadelphia County Republican Party leader  
Billy Meehan, who held a rally for her at a union hall in Philadelphia,  
and Centre County and Chester County Republicans, who organized  
fundraising dinners for her in State College and Valley Forge.93  
Some supporters paid a price for their work for Hafer. Delaware  
County Republican Committee Chair Tom Judge, who said he has always 
been	“Republican	first”	and	was	determined	not	to	be	a	single-issue	 
man, found that his work for Hafer triggered personal attacks.  
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“The prolife people went down to the archdiocese. They wanted to  
excommunicate me because I endorsed Barbara Hafer.” 
 On November 6, 1990, Hafer lost to Casey by 36 points. She thought 
her career in politics was over. But Hillman helped her to regroup, 
raise money, and prepare for the next campaign. Hafer went on to win 
reelection for auditor general and was twice elected state treasurer. 
	 Throughout	her	time	in	office,	Hafer	never	changed	her	mind	on	
the question of abortion rights. She did realize something else, however: 
“I was essentially in the wrong party.” In 2003, Hafer once again became 
a Democrat. 
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Elsie Hillman and gubernatorial candidate Tom Ridge make one last sweep through Allegheny County 
on primary election day, 1994.
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Tom Ridge
 One of the people at Elsie Hillman’s 1979 bacon-and-egg breakfast 
for George H.W. Bush was Tom Ridge, a young attorney from Erie, 
Pa.94  Ridge said he was impressed by Bush, who struck him as “an able, 
dignified,	and	quality	guy”	with	the	experience	needed	to	be	president.	
Ridge returned home ready to volunteer for Bush but not suspecting 
that Hillman would soon ask him to lead the effort to elect Bush in the 
northwestern corner of the state, for while Hillman was busy introducing 
Bush to Pennsylvanians through large-scale events, she also was  
establishing the structure to recruit, energize, and deploy thousands of 
volunteers in 28 counties in Pennsylvania. 
	 In	this,	she	had	the	help	of	Bush’s	field	representative,	Ron	Kaufman,	
and 21-year old Mark Holman, who was her only paid employee on the 
Bush campaign. Near the end of the year, Hillman still needed a coordi-
nator for critical Erie County (Erie was then the third largest city in the 
state), so she called Erie County’s Republican chair, Roger Richards. 
Richards recommended Ridge, saying he would “do a hell of a job,” so 
Hillman called Ridge, who agreed to be Bush’s Erie County coordinator.
 Holman, who worked closely with Ridge on the Bush primary 
campaign, remembers that the campaign Ridge organized for Bush 
was inclusive of income, race, and position. “We had a very aggressive, 
grassroots effort. … It was very coalition oriented, with labor, African 
Americans, any and all Republicans.” The coalitions Ridge built were 
able to turn out the vote for Bush during the April 1980 primary; his 
defeat	of	Ronald	Reagan	in	Erie	County	contributed	significantly	to	
Bush’s statewide win.
 Despite Bush’s Pennsylvania primary win, Reagan was ahead  
in the national delegate count, and by mid-May, he had secured all  
of the delegates he needed to win the Republican nomination. But  
the strength of Bush’s showing in Pennsylvania and his impressive 
organization would factor into Reagan’s decision to choose Bush as his 
running mate. The Reagan-Bush campaign hired many in the original 
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Bush apparatus, including Kaufman and Holman, and they were able  
to reengage Bush volunteers like Ridge for the general election. 
 That November, Reagan and Bush won the election, carrying  
Pennsylvania and the largely Democratic Erie County. One month later, 
when the 27 members of Pennsylvania’s Electoral College gathered in 
Harrisburg to vote, Ridge was one of the few original Bush supporters  
in a room of Reagan devotees because Hillman had advocated with 
state party leaders that he be accorded this honor. It was one of many  
of	her	expressions	of	confidence	to	come.	
Running for Congress
 Throughout most of 1980, Ridge worked at the downtown Erie  
law	firm	he	had	joined	after	graduating	from	law	school.	It	was	there	
that he met several people who would become lifelong friends and  
supporters,	including	Michael	Veschecco,	an	attorney	with	an	office	
in	a	firm	down	the	hall.	Ridge	liked	and	respected	Veschecco	and	so	
supported him when he decided to run for Erie County district attorney 
in 1980. Ridge’s support for his friend might have been seen as remark-
able outside the county: Veschecco was a Democrat, and Ridge was  
fast	becoming	one	of	the	more	high-profile	Republicans	in	the	area.	 
But crossing party lines, either formally or behind-the-scenes, was not  
unheard	of	in	Erie.	Ridge	himself	later	would	benefit	from	the	support	
of	a	Democratic	mayor	and	state	senator	when	he	ran	for	office.	And	
Ridge’s upbringing seems to have taught him to hear both sides. His 
father was a loyal Democrat, his mother a GOP committeewoman, 
and every evening the family debated. According to his mother, Laura 
Ridge, the dinner table discussion could be about “Politics. Religion. 
Browns. Steelers. It could have been anything.”95  
 When Veschecco won the election for district attorney, he asked 
Ridge	to	join	his	staff	as	a	prosecutor.	Ridge	took	his	first	job	in	govern-
ment, one of three Republicans on Veschecco’s staff.96
 It was around this time that Ridge began thinking about running 
for Congress and called Kaufman, who was working at the Republican 
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National Committee, to ask for his advice. Kaufman suggested that 
Ridge call Holman in Pittsburgh to see if he would be willing to come to 
Erie	to	run	the	campaign.	Holman	agreed,	and	in	Hillman’s	files	from	
that	time	is	this	record	of	a	call	Holman	placed	to	her	office:	“Mark	
Holman called and Tom Ridge from Erie is interested in running for 
Congress, but not against Clinger [popular incumbent Representative 
Bill Clinger, a moderate Republican], so depends on redistricting.  
He is going to see Bill McInturff [who was working for the National 
Republican Congressional Committee]. Robbie Robinson will also be 
running. Mark favors Ridge as [he] thinks [Ridge is] young, bright,  
reasonable and stays free of party contention in Erie area. Wondered 
if you would considering [sic] putting word in for him to McInturff.”97 
Hillman made the call to McInturff, setting the stage for Ridge’s  
first	run.	
 Ridge did not have to face an incumbent because the City of Erie 
was moved to a different congressional district and the Republican  
who	held	the	office	decided	not	to	run	for	reelection.	Still,	when	Ridge	
declared	his	candidacy,	he	entered	a	competitive	primary	field,	so	
Ridge and Holman activated the network of volunteers that they had 
built during the Bush primary and recruited other family and friends 
as “Ridge Runners” to knock on doors, drop off pamphlets, and make 
telephone calls for the candidate. Ridge and his wife, Michele, took  
out a second mortgage on their house to seed the campaign, and the 
popular Senator John Heinz, who was seeking reelection that year, 
came to the district several times to speak for Ridge. Hillman persuaded 
Gerald Ford to provide Ridge with his endorsement, and Kaufman, now 
political	director	for	the	office	of	Vice	President	Bush,	traveled	to	Erie	 
to speak at fundraising events and on televised interviews.
 Ridge won the Republican primary and faced Democratic State 
Senator Anthony Andrezeski in a tough year for Republicans. Ronald 
Reagan’s popularity had fallen and it was clear that his party would 
lose big in the midterm elections. No one held much hope that Ridge, 
a relative unknown, would be able to hold onto the seat in a district in 
102
which Democrats outnumbered Republicans by more than 15 percentage 
points.	But	Ridge	enjoyed	some	significant	advantages.	People	in	the	
area knew his father, who was a salesman for Armour Meat, and they 
knew Ridge as a hometown kid who excelled in school and sports and had 
gone	to	Harvard	University,	then	law	school,	finishing	his	degree	only	
after being drafted and serving as an infantry sergeant in Vietnam. (Ridge 
was awarded the Bronze Star for valor.) Ridge also had generous cam-
paign contributions from Heinz and the Hillmans. With Hillman’s help, 
the RNC had arranged to match each dollar that Ridge raised, and he 
succeeded in drawing the RNC’s maximum of $50,000 for his campaign. 
 Ridge also had some help from a few Democrats behind the scenes. 
Erie Mayor Louis Tullio, no fan of Andrezeski, backed Ridge, and his 
support is thought to have yielded thousands of votes for Ridge. Similarly, 
popular State Representative David DiCarlo supported Ridge because 
he saw in Ridge the makings of a statesman. DiCarlo “quietly let many 
people in his vast political network know that he and his wife were  
backing Ridge,” according to an Erie Times-News series. And Ridge’s 
friend, Democrat Gary Horton, went with Ridge to African American 
churches, where, according to Horton, “some people had never seen a 
Republican before. They genuinely appreciate someone coming to them 
and reaching out to them.”98 Holman said, “One of the things that Elsie 
taught	me	and	Governor	Ridge—although	it	fit	our	nature—was	that	
everyone mattered. We tried to appeal to all groups. That is the kind  
of constituency politics that Elsie had, and Heinz had, and Governor 
Ridge had.”
 Ridge was elected to Congress in November 1982 by 729 votes,  
becoming a standout in his party in a year in which 26 incumbent  
Republicans lost their seats.
 Once in Congress, Ridge showed that his vote could be quite inde-
pendent of his party’s leadership. When Reagan called Ridge to the  
Oval	Office	to	ask	for	his	support	of	a	bill	to	appropriate	funding	for	 
MX missiles, Ridge listened to what the president had to say and then  
explained why he saw things differently. He voted against the bill  
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and with the Democrats, which helped to kill the missile program.  
In a National Review article that looked back at Ridge’s voting record, 
John J. Miller wrote, “At a time when Reagan was peeling off Democrats 
on Cold War issues, Ridge consistently played the dove. He voted to 
support the nuclear freeze, abolish the MX missile, deny funding to the 
Nicaraguan contra rebels, and adopt [Democrat] Pat Schroeder’s plan  
to bar nuclear tests above one kiloton. On funding for the Strategic  
Defense Initiative, Ridge wasn’t just a ‘no’ vote, but a leader in the  
enemy camp.”99	His	votes	were	not	simply	a	reflection	of	his	largely	
Democratic base; although Ridge voted for a minimum wage plan, he 
also voted for a ban on assault weapons, knowing that this would  
incur the anger of many of his pro-gun constituents and the National 
Rifle	Association,	which	sent	300,000	anti-Ridge	postcards	to	Pennsyl-
vania voters. 100 
 Ridge’s standing with the electorate in his district only improved.  
He	won	each	of	his	five	congressional	reelection	races	by	wide	margins.	
Race for governor
 In 1990, when Republicans selected Barbara Hafer to be their can-
didate	for	governor,	she	knew	that	she	was	not	the	party’s	first	choice.	
Many	had	been	looking	to	Ridge	to	run,	Hillman	first	among	them.	
Believing that they had signals from him that he would enter the race, 
they arranged for the state committee meeting to be held in Erie that 
year. But just prior to the meeting, Ridge held a press conference to say 
just the opposite. According to Holman, Ridge had been close to announ-
cing his candidacy until he talked with business leaders and realized 
that	they	were	satisfied	with	Democratic	Governor	Robert	Casey— 
something that Hafer soon found to be true. 
 The day after Hafer lost the election to Casey, Ridge began to plan  
for his 1994 run for governor. 
 Ridge was popular and well known in Erie, but he was recognized by 
fewer than 10 percent of Pennsylvania voters. A key part of his initial 
strategy in becoming known and trusted was to court party leaders and 
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local	elected	officials.	Well	before	declaring	his	candidacy,	he	established	
the Fund for Pennsylvania Leadership, a political action committee to 
support candidates in state and local elections. The fund targeted races 
in which “Ridge’s cash would make a key difference in the outcome of 
an election, tilting it to the Republican and creating a future ally in the 
process.”101 Ridge also turned to Hillman for help in meeting committee 
members. “I didn’t know a lot of people on the other side of the state,  
but she did,” said Ridge. And he continued his courtship of Republican 
“royalty” in the state, including Bob Asher; Billy Meehan; John McNichol 
(a Delaware County GOP power broker); Herb Barness, the Bucks County 
real estate developer and Republican national committeeman; and Marilyn 
Ware Lewis, chair of the PA American Water company, who became one 
of his campaign cochairs. 
 At least a few people tried to derail Ridge’s aspirations by urging 
him to run for U.S. Senate instead. The Philadelphia Inquirer reported 
that “Some top Republicans, including those close to state Attorney  
General Ernie Preate—who also wants to be governor—have been trying 
to steer Ridge away from the governor’s race to give Preate a wider berth 
and avoid a GOP bloodbath.”102 But Ridge had his sights set on the gover-
nor’s	office	and	announced	his	candidacy	in	February	1993—21	months	
ahead of the general election.
 A Philadelphia reporter called Ridge “the guy nobody’s heard of from 
the city nobody’s ever seen,”103 and it is true that he started far behind the 
better-known candidates—Preate; State Senator Mike Fisher of Allegheny 
County; Samuel Katz, a Philadelphia businessman; and State Senator 
Earl Baker of Chester County. 
 Sensing Ridge’s uphill battle and eager to signal her full support, 
Hillman hosted one of her now-signature breakfasts for Ridge, following 
the model of the breakfast she had given for Bush more than a decade 
earlier. With Pittsburgh attorney (now Pennsylvania Governor) Tom 
Corbett, the chair of Allegheny County’s Ridge for Governor campaign, 
Hillman organized the Meet Tom Ridge breakfast. With a host committee, 
they handwrote notes on hundreds of invitations and made calls to  
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coordinate the event with committee members across Western Penn-
sylvania.	On	December	7,	1993,	buses	filled	with	supporters	arrived	
at Pittsburgh’s William Penn Hotel—1,300 people in all, each paying 
$19.94 for the breakfast. The event was a public relations success,  
gaining media attention, but most importantly, from Ridge’s perspective, 
it signaled the embrace of Hillman. 
 Asher and Meehan organized similar events in the eastern part 
of the state, and by the end of January 1994, Ridge had lined up the 
endorsements of the all-important Republican committees in Bucks, 
Delaware, and Philadelphia counties.
		 Ridge	also	had	assembled	a	strong	group	of	financial	supporters.	
Contributions from Ware Lewis; her mother, Marion Ware; Barness; 
and Asher totaled hundreds of thousands of dollars. Ridge’s friends in 
Erie were contributing heavily, too, and the Hillmans gave more than 
$150,000	over	the	course	of	the	campaign.	By	the	time	the	first	quarterly	
reports	were	due	to	be	filed	with	the	state,	Ridge	had	raised	$2	million.	
Ware Lewis said, “The cash made him a contender. Even Democrats 
were startled by how much and were asking me, ‘Who is this guy  
from Erie?’ ”104 
 The Republican Party in Pennsylvania desperately needed a real  
contender. It had been eight years since a Republican (Dick Thornburgh) 
had been governor; after Heinz’s death in 1991, they had lost the  
senator's seat during the special election; and Bill Clinton had beaten 
Bush in Pennsylvania in 1992. Many in the party leadership, including  
the state Republican committee chair, Anne Anstine, thought that the 
party needed to get behind an appealing candidate to show that it could 
pull off a win. Chris Bravacos, who had served as executive director  
of the Republican state committee (RSC), said, “Anne and Elsie were  
convinced, going back to the early ’90s, that the party had to endorse  
for governor. ... Right after ’92 was over, which was a disaster, we  
were hell-bent on proving that the party could do something again.”
 Seeing the growing strength of Ridge, the other candidates lobbied 
state committee members to hold an open primary and not to endorse  
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a candidate. Of course, Ridge worked to do just the opposite. He hired  
Stephen Dunkle (who had been executive director of the RSC) to manage 
his endorsement campaign, because Dunkle knew the committee’s rules 
well and was an excellent strategist. Hillman was one of many Ridge  
supporters who doggedly called dozens of committee members across the 
state, urging them to endorse Ridge at their upcoming meeting and main-
taining a running tally of how they intended to vote. Ridge’s supporters 
worked to persuade committee members that they should vote yes on the 
first	question	(whether	or	not	to	endorse	at	all)	and	Ridge	on	the	second	
question (who to endorse). From these daily calls, the campaign knew  
that most of Ridge’s support was from party members in the western  
and southeastern parts of the state. 
 This made the snowstorm on the February morning of the committee 
vote a big problem for Ridge. The storm had dumped more than 9 inches, 
leaving state committee members at the farthest reaches of the state leery 
of driving the 200 miles from Pittsburgh or Erie to Harrisburg. Hillman 
quickly responded to make sure committee members could get there safely. 
She organized car pools of all-wheel-drive vehicles, rented buses to pick  
up committee members, and ordered box lunches for their long drives. 
Most of Ridge’s supporters made it to Harrisburg that day.
	 When	Anstine	called	for	a	vote	on	the	first	question,	the	majority	 
of the committee members voted in favor of endorsing a gubernatorial 
candidate. On the second vote—the question of who to endorse— 
Ridge won.
 After the vote, spurned candidate Katz said that the party machine 
“couldn’t deliver pizza,” but that proved not to be true.105 The RSC  
turned out the volunteers and raised the money that quickly bolstered 
Ridge’s campaign, and Ridge was able to move his campaign staff in  
Harrisburg into RSC headquarters and coordinate the election effort  
with the committee’s leaders and staff. The strength of the Ridge  
campaign convinced Baker to drop out of the race.
 Ridge won the primary election, beating Preate by six percentage 
points and the other contenders by greater margins. He turned next  
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to face incumbent Lieutenant Governor Mark Singel, the Democrats’ 
choice	from	among	their	own	crowded	field	in	the	primary.	Singel,	who	
had served as governor for several months while Casey was recovering 
from transplant surgery, campaigned as the experienced candidate.  
Both Ridge and Singel were challenged by Independent Peg Luksik,  
the woman who nearly defeated Barbara Hafer in the Republican  
primary four years earlier and who still enjoyed conservative backing  
in central and Western Pennsylvania.
 Ridge started out well behind in the name recognition enjoyed by 
both Singel and Luksik. But the network of Republican committee mem-
bers	and	elected	officials	across	the	state	continued	to	work	for	Ridge.	 
And	the	campaign,	while	not	flawless,	continued	to	attract	millions	of	
dollars in contributions that allowed Ridge to air television ads early 
on. He began to narrow the gap with Singel. 
 When Hillman saw issues with the campaign, she let Holman and 
Ridge know it. One of these times was in August 1994, after a set of 
embarrassing	Ridge	campaign	press	maneuvers	reflected	badly	on	him.	
Hillman called a meeting with Ridge, Anstine, and Holman to help to 
steer the campaign back on course. Later in the campaign, she contacted 
Ridge to sound an alarm after he had met with representatives of  
conservative organizations and State Representative Joseph Pitts  
of Chester County in an effort to understand their point of view and, 
perhaps, win over Luksik supporters. Hillman got a copy of the letter 
that Ridge sent to Pitts following the meeting in which he wrote that 
he	wished	to	work	with	conservative	groups	to	find	“issues	of	mutual	
concern and commitment,” including reducing the number of unwanted 
pregnancies, promoting adoption, and keeping in place the state’s 24-hour 
waiting period prior to an abortion.106 Hillman felt the meeting and 
the letter would align Ridge too closely with the party’s right wing;  
she wrote to him that she had heard that his letter was “proudly bran-
dished” by the state director of the Pennsylvania Christian Coalition 
at a meeting with conservatives where the director claimed that it was 
the religious conservatives who had engineered the Ridge-Pitt meeting. 
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 The campaign had already begun to gain traction when, that fall, 
terrible news hit. A man whose life sentence had been commuted by 
the Pennsylvania Board of Pardons and been released from prison was 
charged with committing a violent crime. One of the three members on 
the Board of Pardons who had recommended to Governor Casey that the 
man be released was Singel. Singel expressed his sorrow and regret for  
his part in the decision, but from that point forward, the electorate’s  
support for him began to drop.
 That November, Singel won just 40 percent of the vote. Luksik’s share 
was a surprising 13 percent. Ridge was elected governor of Pennsylvania. 
 Hillman had intended to retire in 1993, but remained a Republican 
national committeewoman because she wanted to help elect Ridge  
governor. After she did step down as committeewoman, she came out  
of retirement to support Texas Governor George W. Bush’s campaign 
because many expected that he might choose Ridge as his running mate; 
Ridge and Bush were friends and Ridge clearly could be an asset during 
the election, having won his second term as governor by a 780,000-vote 
margin, with a large share of crossover votes. Ridge had even brokered  
a Pittsburgh “summit” between John McCain and Bush that led to  
McCain’s endorsement of Bush in May of 2000. But the very qualities 
that had inspired Hillman to support Ridge 20 years earlier would  
scuttle his chances of being Bush’s running mate. William Kristol,  
editor of The Weekly Standard, said, “I think Bush would like to pick 
Ridge, but I think they’re worried about a pro-life revolt and giving  
[the issue] to Pat Buchanan.”107 Francis Clines wrote in The New York 
Times that social and religious conservatives “have issued stern warnings 
to Mr. Bush of dire consequences in November if he picks someone like 
Mr. Ridge.”108 It appeared to one Pittsburgh Post-Gazette columnist  
that “Nobody seems to like Tom Ridge but the voters.”109
	 Hillman	was	nonetheless	gratified	to	see	Ridge’s	continued	public	
service. After the September 11 tragedy, Bush named Ridge homeland 
security advisor and, when the U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
was formed, Ridge became its founding secretary. 
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L e f t  b y  t h e  P a r t y

 A few years after her retirement from leadership in the Republican 
Party,	Elsie	Hillman	wrote	to	a	Republican	National	Committee	official:
  I have tried, through the years, to work from the inside, in an   
  effort to both broaden our base and to present a compassionate  
  and socially sensitive face on the Republican Party. A compas- 
  sionate conservative I have tried to be, and I was encouraged  
  when the President [George W. Bush] took this position.  
  Unfortunately, I no longer believe that the Republican Party  
  knows how to do that and I am not proud of the face that the  
  Republican Party is now showing to the nation and the world.  
  We, like Jeffords [Republican Senator James Jeffords of  
  Vermont, who became an Independent], felt that the right  
  wing of the Party has become so pivotal in all the national  
  debates that there are no ears left to listen to us.110
 Hillman’s sadness and disappointment in her party had deepened 
in the years before she retired. For four decades, she had heralded the 
values of moderation and inclusion and worked hard for party unity, 
but she increasingly felt that the party she had known was slipping 
away. Her warnings to party leaders had been for naught, and some  
of the leaders had accommodated what she saw as intolerance from  
the right wing. Instead of inviting in a broader base, she feared that 
the party was now cementing in place a set of ideas that had more to  
do with personal morality than governance.
 Moderates fell away from the party, and women left to vote for  
Independents and Democrats. A few moderate friends, like Jeffords 
and Hillman’s friend, Senator Arlen Specter, changed their party  
affiliation	altogether.	
 Pennsylvania’s Andy Gleason, Republican county chair in Cambria  
County since the 1950s, remarked on the changes he had witnessed: 
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“The party today is not the party I knew. You had the Bill Scrantons. 
You had the Elsie Hillmans. ... I’ve always considered myself a moderate. 
We	were	trying	to	keep	it	a	party	for	the	people	first.”
 Shifting tides
 Hillman never left the Republican Party. It left her and her fellow 
moderates, returning to an evangelical religious base while reverting to 
the polarization of an earlier period in history.111
 While she could not have realized it, Hillman had become a Repub-
lican during a period when evangelical religious beliefs and party  
affiliation	were	relatively	separate.	Harvard	University	economists	 
Edward Glaeser and Bryce Ward have studied the connection between  
the two and found that the period from 1932 to 1976 was unusual for the   
relatively minor role of religion in party politics—compared with the  
much greater entwinement of the two in the times before and after.
 Glaeser and Ward came to this conclusion after collecting the  
county-level returns for presidential elections between 1864 and 2000 
and the religious censuses during that period for Christian religions. 
They then ran a regression to see if there was a relationship between 
people’s	religious	affiliation	and	Republicanism.	Their	statistical	analysis	
indicates that there was a strong correlation between being a mainline 
(not evangelical) Protestant and voting Republican until the middle 
of the 20th century. Until then, evangelical Protestants were mostly 
Democrats. That changed in the 1960s, when a large number of southern 
evangelical	Christians	switched	their	affiliation	to	the	Republican	Party.112 
 Glaeser and Ward wrote in 2005, “Thirty years ago, income was a  
better predictor of party than religious attendance. Today, religion rather 
than earnings predicts Republicanism. The rise of religious politics is not 
without precedent. Prior to 1930, the correlation between religion and 
party	affiliation	across	states	seems	to	have	been	at	least	as	strong	as	it	
is today.”113  
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 People like Hillman, who joined the party during the Dwight D. 
Eisenhower years, would have entered politics at a time when religious 
identity was not enmeshed with party identity. It also happened to be 
a window of time during which cooperation between Republicans and 
Democrats was high.
 The window would soon start to close. In their analysis of polariza-
tion in the United States, Nolan McCarty, Keith T. Poole, and Howard 
Rosenthal found that the distance between Democrats and Republicans 
was very high in the period before 1920; moved to a period of greater 
agreement during the 1930s to the 1970s; but then climbed again in the 
1980s, with polarization continuing to rise into 2010. The researchers’ 
method	involved	first	identifying	the	factors	that	best	explained	differ-
ences in voting patterns in Congress from 1789 forward, which required 
them to classify more than 100,000 House and Senate roll call votes  
and place each congressional member “on a minus/plus scale across  
n dimensions.”  It took just two dimensions—economics and regional  
divisions—to	get	a	good	fit	for	these	100,000	votes.	With	this	method,	they	
were able to look at changes in voting patterns and measure the distance 
between Democrats and Republicans in the U.S. House and Senate.114
 The chart on page 112, which is from an updated version of the  
chart published in the book Polarized America, shows the changes  
in polarization between Democrats and Republicans on votes over the 
course of more than a century. As the degree of polarization between  
the parties increases, the line on the graph climbs closer to 1.0. The 
lowest degree of polarization was in the period from 1935 to 1952.  
(“R” indicates Reconstruction.)
 What happened in the second half of the 20th century to widen  
the divergence between Republicans and Democrats and reignite the 
marriage of party and religion? Certainly the messages sent by Barry  
M. Goldwater and Richard Nixon to Southerners brought more evan- 
gelicals into the party, and, later, the IRS actions under Jimmy Carter  
galvanized the religious right, who could enter the Republican Party’s 
open door and build a coalition with more traditional conservatives.  
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It	also	is	true	that	changes	in	federal	election	laws	reduced	the	influence	
of larger donors and tipped the balance toward those groups (like evan-
gelicals) that could raise small amounts of money from many people. 
Those laws led to the proliferation of political action committees, including 
many that were ideologically based, and their contributions and technical 
help gave candidates much greater independence from the state parties, 
which cared less about ideology than they did about winning. 
	 Democrats	and	Republicans	alike	would	find	that	candidates’	growing	
independence from the party apparatus would allow them to style them-
selves as purists and make them willing to appeal to the wings of each 
party, where there was passion and energy and money. Once elected, 
their voting records increasingly aligned with the extremes, not the center.
 James Thompson of the RAND Corporation said that it is really  
the electorate that has shifted and that candidates are simply catching 
up with them. “Over time, communities and regions of the country have 
become more homogeneous—politically, ideologically, demographically, 
House
Senate
Source: Party Polarization 1879–2010. Updated January 2011. 
voteview.com/polarizedamerica.asp
Party Polarization 1879–2011
Distance between the Parties First Dimension
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and	in	terms	of	‘way	of	life,’	”	wrote	Thompson.	A	significant	factor	in	 
this is the degree of migration within the country and the fact that  
people are choosing to live in places “with people like them. ... The principal 
reason for the growth of congressional polarization over the past 35  
years appears to be that—over time—the constituencies in congressional  
districts and in states have been changing their political outlooks to 
become more strongly conservative or liberal. ... The biggest victims of  
this process have been the moderates, who have largely disappeared  
on both sides of the aisle.”115
 In essence, we have gerrymandered ourselves.
Uncharted territory
 If it is true that voters are choosing to live in towns where people 
think and act like them, it is all the more important to look to the  
example of someone who chose the unfamiliar over the comfortable  
to enrich her community and her own life. 
 Hillman’s life in politics challenges us to look for those chances to 
engage	others,	to	find	ways	of	“inducing	cooperation,”	and	to	use	our	 
creativity to spark change. Indeed, as Hillman herself has said, politics  
can be a bridge among us:
	 	Each	of	us	comes	from	a	narrow	background.	It	is	defined	 
  by our families, our neighborhoods, our schools, our social 
  life, and our work. It is possible for us to live here and know   
  little about our community except how to make the rounds   
  from one familiar place and face to another. What lies between   
  usually remains uncharted territory. Politics eliminates that  
  unfamiliarity. Politics is a total community engagement.116
    –Elsie Hillman, 1984
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T I M E L I N E
1941 Begins volunteering at age 16 at the Eye and Ear Hospital, calculating ether  
 dosages for patients
1945 Marries Henry Hillman
1952 Volunteers as one of “Ike’s Girls” during the Dwight D. Eisenhower 
 presidential campaign
  Joins the Pittsburgh Symphony Orchestra Board of Directors
1954 Begins volunteering at WQED
1956 Elected Republican committee member from the 14th Ward, City of Pittsburgh
1960 Appointed volunteer chair, Republican Committee of Allegheny County (RCAC) 
1962 Elected secretary, RCAC
  Organizes outreach to African American voters as a volunteer for William Scranton’s  
 campaign for Pennsylvania governor
1964 Elected GOP chair, 14th Ward (retired in 1974)
  Elected alternate delegate to the Republican National Convention in San Francisco 
1965 Serves on a leadership committee to form the Hill House Association from the  
 merger of the Anna B. Heldman Community Center and Soho Settlement House
    Joins the Allegheny County Anti-Poverty Advisory Council
1966 Plays integral role in Dick Thornburgh for Congress campaign
 Becomes a lifetime board member of the Ellis School
1967 Elected chair, RCAC
  Joins board of Mount Mercy College (now Carlow University)
year Political and community/Personal activities
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1968 Elected delegate to the Republican National Convention in Miami Beach 
1970 Retires as chair, RCAC
1971 Chairs labor for Heinz during H. John Heinz III’s campaign for Congress
  Receives The new Pittsburgh Courier’s Top Hat Award
1972 Elected delegate to the Republican National Convention in Miami Beach 
1973 Elected to the vestry, Calvary Episcopal Church (served until 1977)
1974 Becomes member, Pennsylvania Republican leadership Committee  
 (serves until 1996)
  Elected vice president of the Hill House Association  
  Elected vice president of the Pittsburgh Symphony Society
  Receives Distinguished Daughter of Pennsylvania award 
1975 Elected Pennsylvania committeewoman to the Republican National Committee   
 (RNC) and appointed to the Rules Committee
 Joins Shadyside Hospital Foundation Board of Directors 
1976 Elected delegate and selected as floor leader (for President Gerald Ford)  
 at the Republican National Convention in Kansas City, Mo.;  
 cochairs Ford’s Pennsylvania campaign
 Chairs labor for Heinz during his U.S. Senate campaign
1977 Chairs “kitchen cabinet” for Doris Carson Williams’ run for Pittsburgh City Council
1978 Elected to the Executive Committee of RNC (serves until 1996)
  Cochairs the primary campaign for Dick Thornburgh for Pennsylvania governor
1979 Chairs George H.W. Bush presidential campaign in Pennsylvania and serves  
 on his national campaign steering committee
1980 Elected delegate to the Republican National Convention in Detroit 
1982 Serves on the state steering committee, Heinz for Senate
  Provides support for Tom Ridge’s run for Congress
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1983 Chairs “kitchen cabinet” for Barbara Hafer in her run for Allegheny  
 County commissioner
1984 Serves as a delegate to the Republican National Convention in Dallas  
 and as Pennsylvania’s Reagan-Bush reelection cochair  
  Begins serving on RNC’s Executive Council (serves until 1996)
1985 Elected vice chair, University of Pittsburgh’s newly established Cancer Institute
1986 Serves as state chair of Arlen Specter’s U.S. Senate campaign
  Volunteers for the Pittsburgh AIDS Task Force
1987 Serves as general chair, Pennsylvania, George Bush for President Committee
1988 Elected delegate to the Republican National Convention in New Orleans  
 and cochair of Pennsylvania delegation
  Supports Hafer in her run for Pennsylvania auditor general
  Chairs the Art for AIDS benefit, Persad Center
1989 Elected chair, Pennsylvania Electoral College
1990 Cochairs Hafer’s campaign for Pennsylvania governor
1992 Elected delegate to the Republican National Convention in Houston 
  Serves as general chair, Bush-Quayle ’92
1993 Helps to lead the support for the passage of the Allegheny Regional Asset  
 District legislation (Act 77 of 1993)
1994 Cochairs statewide steering committee of Ridge for Governor
  Helps to form the Interfaith Alliance of Southwestern Pennsylvania
1996 Elected delegate to the Republican National Convention in San Diego  
 and member of the Platform Committee
  Retires as the longest-serving Pennsylvania Republican national committeewoman
  Elsie Awards established at WQED Multimedia
1997 Cochairs the Regional Renaissance Initiative referendum campaign
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1998 Cochairs Ridge’s reelection campaign for governor
  Helps to launch the National Republican leadership Council
  Cochairs Allegheny 2000 Home Rule referendum campaign
 Cochairs Jim Roddey’s campaign for Allegheny County executive
2000 Elected delegate at large for Republican National Convention in Philadelphia 
  Joins the National Board of Republican Majority for Choice 
  Joins the Riverlife Task Force
  Helps to create the Pennsylvania Center for Women and Politics  
 at Chatham University
2003 Cochairs Pittsburgh Financial leadership Committee with David Roderick
2004 Cochairs Save Our Summers campaign to raise $1 million to reopen public  
 swimming pools and recreation centers
2005 Helps to lead the row office reform referendum campaign in Allegheny County
2006 Cochairs William Scranton III’s primary campaign for Pennsylvania governor
  Founds Run Baby Run, a bipartisan political action committee supporting  
 women candidates for the state legislature
  Establishes and chairs the board of the Elsie H. Hillman Foundation
2007 Joins the steering committee of youth Futures
2008 Helps to launch the Neighbor-Aid campaign to respond to health and human 
 services needs 
  Receives the leading light Award from the International Women’s Forum
  Serves as honorary cochair of Pittsburgh 250
2009 Receives the Urban league of Greater Pittsburgh’s inaugural lifetime  
 Achievement Award
2011 Receives The Forbes Funds' Shapira Medal for Exemplary leadership
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